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Erôs in Plato’s Republic 
 
Maria Eugenia Yupanqui Aurich 
 
The Republic is the most studied of Plato’s dialogues, yet it is rarely approach as a work that 
elaborates on the implications of erôs. This thesis attempts to show that the Republic is also a 
dialogue about erôs, such as the Symposium and the Phaedrus, for it also aims at providing a 
direction to man’s striving. The Republic deals specifically with the morphology of the soul and 
its erotic nature. The soul is depicted by Plato as a manifold of erotic forces that, if properly 
ordered, show man his kinship with the Good, the source of all being. The Good is theorized as 
the eternal and unchanging, placing it outside the world of phenomena. Therefore, the 
psychological picture provided in the Republic is one of the first theorizations of the soul and its 
transcendental constitution. To this effect, this theoretical approach aims to overcome Kantian 
interpretations, since they tend to overlook the genuine concern Plato had for metaphysics. The 
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Plato’s philosophy, is not a philosophy, but the symbolic form in which a Dionysiac soul 
expresses its ascent to God. If Plato’s evocation of a paradigm of right order is 
interpreted as a philosopher’s opinion about politics, the result will be hopeless 
nonsense, not a worth of debate. 
    – Eric Voegelin, Order and History Vol. 3, 125.  
 
Voegelin’s assessment of the Republic is courageous and unapologetic. If we do not let Voegelin 
offend our sensibilities and remain open to the possibility that much of what have been said about 
the Republic in the last decades has been “hopeless nonsense,” we might be in for a treat. 
Voegelin does not mean that there are not political implications to Plato’s writings, but rather that 
Plato’s thought is not properly understood by interpreting the Republic as a coherent scheme of 
opinions. Plato’s philosophy, or what Pierre Hadot would refer as philosophia “to eliminate the 
preconceptions the word philosophy may evoke in the modern mind,” is not a system of ideas.1 
What is being discussed in the Republic is not concepts, but rather realities of human existence.  
The distinction between concepts and realities is critical to the argument of this thesis. If 
we are to say that Plato is concerned with the latter rather than with the former, we are affirming 
that Plato is concerned with reality itself and hence with how we come to know reality for what it 
really is. To this effect, such a distinction entails awareness of Emmanuel Kant’s influence on the 
interpretation of the Platonic corpus. The distinction focuses mainly on the restrictions attributed 
to the mind after his Critique of Pure Reason, which focuses on the nature of human knowledge 
and its objects. In sum, Kant argues that we can only have cognition of appearances and that we 
cannot really know things in themselves, given that cognition is limited to the cognitive faculties, 
what we shall refer as the “categories of the understanding.” 2  Kant called his critique 
“transcendental idealism” or “critical idealism.”3  
                                                        
1 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 53. 
2  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), A248–A249. 
3 Allen W. Wood, Kant (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 63. 
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Despite the many virtues of the Kantian tradition, its influence in our contemporary world 
has a tendency to distort the insights of philosophers such as Plato, who did not set the same 
restrictions to the mind. In the classical sense, philosophers are people who are in pursuit of truth 
as reality.4 By truth, I simply mean what exists, what is (hence, being). Philosophy is then, 
strictly speaking, a quest for knowledge of what is, for as Socrates highlights in the Republic, we 
cannot know what it is not (476e; 478a). The main assumption of a classical philosopher is that 
one can get to know reality for what it really is. Now, ancient thought was not homogeneous and 
debates about what is real were frequent. In fact, the Republic can be approached as a debate 
between Thrasymachus and Socrates regarding reality. The point of this distinction, however, is 
not to underestimate the complexity of the ancients, but rather to understand modern thinking and 
the limits it sets to reason. Prior to Kant, philosophers did not think that the mind could only get 
to know the representations (appearances) of objects. It is with Kant that we first started to 
question the capacity of the mind’s reach, that is, what the mind can and cannot know. Of course, 
this is not to say that the pursuit of truth was thought to be a simple matter. On the contrary, the 
difficulties of knowing reality are masterfully illustrates in the Allegory of the Cave. To this 
effect, we must understand that Plato assumed that we can get to know reality, that is, the order of 
being, with the right disposition and a proper education. Perhaps, reality can never be fully 
known, but we have concrete reasons to believe that Plato, unlike modern thinkers, did not doubt 
that it is within the nature of reason (nous) to know reality and its orderly nature (508d). Note 
that this assumption about the “knowability” of reality also tells us something about reality itself, 
that is, reality must be of such a nature that it can be known. In other words, there must be an 
order in reality that reason (nous) is in kinship with and that it is able to grasp.  
The change of focus after Kant had led current scholarship to confuse Plato for an atheist. 
Since Ideas are “subjectivized” to the categories of the understanding, Kantian interpretations are 
unable to appreciate Plato’s genuine concern for metaphysics.5 Disregarding Plato’s emphasis on 
                                                        
4 For Plato, reality is equal to the truth (alêtheia) since truth about reality is subordinated to truth as reality. 
5 In other words, ideas are regarded simply as concepts, as products of the mind, and not as structures in reality that 
the mind is able to grasp. These structures derive their existence from the source of all being, which exists beyond 
the world of phenomena as well as beyond thought and abstractions, that is, beyond the world of becoming 
(metaphysics). The point is to understand that Plato’s argument seeks to provide an intelligible account of reality, a 
teleological account, based on a First Principle (archê) of all being and in all times. This is, of course, part of the 
intellectual discourse of his time that can be traced back to Thales of Miletus. 
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the Divine, Kantian interpretations mainly focus on Plato’s contribution to the history of ideas.6 
Thus, while there has always been disagreement concerning interpretations, nowadays Plato is 
persistently confused for an idealist (in the Kantian sense), as a thinker who is concerned with 
concepts or prepositions rather than concrete realties and their transcendental constitution. 
However, as Voegelin rightly points out, Plato does not have a philosophy. For Plato, philosophy 
is a way of life (philosophia) that consists on exploring the common experience of existing, the 
authentic consciousness of the Good, and the seriousness of deciding how to live.7 Thus, Plato is 
not creatively elaborating on ideas of justice and love, for Plato is not a modern thinker and he is 
not concerned with a place in the history of ideas. Plato inquired into the most important and 
most troubling experiences about human existence, especially about the station of man in the 
world and the tension towards the ground of his being. When the dialogues are not read in this 
manner, much of what Plato is about is lost.8 Therefore, it is the contention of this thesis that any 
interpretation of Plato as a thinker concerned with political ideas or concepts is fundamentally 
flawed. 
As an exploration of the experience of being, Plato’s philosophia is one of the soberest 
and most insightful accounts on the plight of human existence. It is with Plato that classical 
Greek thought reach the pinnacle of authentic consciousness of being, resulting in one of the 
most dignifying redemption of man. Plato’s conviction was that man has an essential kinship 
with the ground of Being (the Good) and that any distortion of his natural essence brings along 
devastating consequences for his social existence.9 Therefore, Plato’s main preoccupation was his 
provision for man’s salvation (sôtêria), which, not surprisingly, is the subject of the Republic.10  
                                                        
6 Note that Divine is capitalized because we are referring to a different plane of existence, which is beyond the world 
of phenomena as well as beyond thought (abstractions). We are referring to the world of Being. By not capitalizing 
the word, we take the risk of understanding the Divine as merely an experience, in the phenomenological sense. Yet, 
for Plato, it was not just as experience, but the Divine is what gives the world of phenomena order and structure.  
7 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 53. 
8  Robert Earl Cushman, Therapeia: Plato’s Conception of Philosophy (New Brunswick, U.S.A: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), xv–xvi; Paul Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1973), 232–235; Eric Voegelin, Order and History, ed. Dante Germino, vol. 3 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 125. 
9 Cushman, Therapeia, xv. 
10 The word sotêria is Plato’s choice. See, for example, 492e. Strictly speaking, the word means safety, that is, out of 
danger. We translate it as salvation because we mean to capture what Plato meant. Now, the meaning of world 
salvation should not be confused with Christian salvation. To be sure, Plato’s understanding does have the overtones, 
but they are only overtones, for its meaning belongs to the discourse of Heraclitus and the order of the cosmos. Plato 
wants to save men from chaos.  
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Essential to understanding the Republic is Plato’s depiction of man as a rational creature 
who exists in tension towards the ground of his existence, the Good. This tension is 
fundamentally an experience, in which man finds himself estranged from and craving for 
fulfillment. Man is a lover, an erotic being always striving for that which stops the yearning and 
brings meaning. The longing is a human experience that cannot be reduced to a word or a 
concept. Yet, for the sake of philosophical discourse, Plato called it erôs. And, although the 
Republic does not particularly elaborates on erôs, as both the Phaedrus and the Symposium do, it 
is the purpose of this thesis to show that erôs is the foundation of the argument in the Republic. 
Thus, the central question guiding my research is: What prompted Plato into inquiry about the 
nature of justice in the Republic?  
The Republic is probably the most studied of Plato’s dialogue, yet it is rarely approached 
as a work that elaborates on the implications of erôs.11 The importance that Plato attributed to 
erôs is axiomatic, for he was quite aware that it is the condition of man and hence any human 
activity is conditioned by it. In other words, the experience of being is, in itself, erotic. For this 
very reason, Plato was fundamentally preoccupied with ordering the striving of man, what he 
referred to as dikaiosune.12 Plato’s endeavor then consisted in addressing the most important 
matter of human existence, the seriousness of deciding how to live, what might be called ethics. 
In this respect, Plato understood that the search for ethical order finds its origin in the experiential 
quest for fulfillment. Thus, what Plato sought to show in the Republic is that erôs is a calling to 
the Good. 
Plato elevated the experience of erôs as calling to the Good because he believed that all 
things, including human beings, draw their reality and value from the Good (516b-c). Plato’s 
conviction was that conforming to the order that the Good set before us is man’s primary 
responsibility and ultimate destiny, since man is, by virtue of his psuchê, aware of it. To this 
extent, the Republic is also a work about the morphology of the human soul and its kinship with 
the Good. The soul is the clue and access to order, to reality. In this sense, the dialogue portrays 
                                                        
11 To my knowledge, there are no resent publications in North American academia in which erôs is taken to be 
central for Plato’s teleology. Erôs is what holds the mortal and the immortal together (Symp. 202e). Cosmologically, 
erôs becomes associated with motion and life, through with all being is animate. See Cushman, Therapeia, 193; 
Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 43. 
12 Dikaiosunê is often translated as justice, but the English word justice fails to capture some of the most important 
connotations it carried, particularly ethical connotations. Thus, as we shall see in the literature review, some scholars 
such as Robin Waterfield choose to translate it as “morality” or “righteousness.” See Waterfield’s introductory 
chapter of his translation of the Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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the search for a standard that has ethical implications for mankind, for Plato recognized that 
man’s salvation lies in properly responding to his calling, to order his life according to the 
exigencies of the Good. Plato would have not arrived at these conclusions if the experience of 
erôs had not prompted him to inquire into the ground of being. It is Plato’s own experience of 
ascent, as Voegelin points out, that brought this great master to vindicate man’s existence.  
Thus, in hope of not making nonsense of the dialogue, I will analyze the Republic as a 
symbol of Plato’s experience of reality. All citations and translations of the classical texts are 
from Plato: Complete Works by Hackett Publishing Company. This thesis will be divided in four 
chapters. The first chapter will provide a comprehensive literature review covering different 
interpretations of Plato’s Republic. The literature review will explore the debate regarding 
interpretative approaches as well as the different theses resulting from them. The purpose of this 
literature review is to provide a context for this thesis and situate it in the recent debate.  
The second chapter will deal with the interpretative approach. This thesis will adopt an 
approach to textual interpretation that focuses on the experience of being. It assumes that Plato’s 
objective was to clarify existence through dialectics. It assumes the Republic to be a symbol of 
Plato’s own experience of reality. Most notable scholars using this approach are Robert Earl 
Cushman, Paul Friedländer, and Eric Voegelin. The theoretical approach understands that the 
dialogue is concerned with the search for order, and the psyche is the clue and access to this 
order.  
  The third chapter will analyze the Republic following the logic of the theoretical 
approach. The analysis will be divided in five sections. The first three sections will focus on 
contextualizing the dialogue. The first section will look into the motivations that prompted Plato 
into writing a dialogue of such a considerable length. First, we will explore the historical 
circumstances in which the dialogue was written, particularly focusing on the rise of the Sophists 
and the fall of Athens after the Peloponnesian War. Likewise, we will review the intellectual 
context, namely, the transition from mythical cosmogony to physicalism due to the discovery of 
Nature.13 This first section will also establish one of the main assumptions of the theoretical 
                                                        
13 As we shall see in the first part of the analysis, Nature is capitalized because it refers to a specific intellectual 
discourse dating back to Thales of Miletus and the Ionian scientists of Nature. According to Aristotle, Thales is the 
first philosopher who sought to discover the origin of all things exclusively in material terms (Metaphysics, 983b). 
Plato’s philosophia should be seen as a reaction to this intellectual debate, that is, as a restoration of the symbols of 
transcendence.  
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framework, that is, the concreteness of Plato’s thought. As pointed out by Socrates, the inquiry 
into the nature of justice is not a question of conventions or ideas, but a question of “what is” in 
reality (438e). 
The second section of the analysis elaborates on the research question of the dialogue, 
“what justice and injustice are and what power each has when it is by itself in the soul?” (358b), 
which is proposed by Plato’s brothers, Glaucon and Adeimantus. We will see in this section an 
articulate account of the arguments that Plato attempts to disprove, including those which find 
corroboration in traditional education.   
The third section of the analysis will deal with the underlying assumption that guides the 
investigation in the dialogue, that is, the city is the soul written large (368d-e). Here, we will see 
how Plato’s discourse (in the Foucaudian sense) belongs to an intellectual discussion regarding 
the discovery of the mind and its experience of transcendence. The underlying assumption is not 
taken to be a metaphor or an analogy, but rather as an insight into human existence.  
The fourth section of the analysis will explore the investigation of the dialogue, 
particularly, Plato’s depiction of man as a lover and how the order is found through love (erôs). 
Therefore, this section tackles Plato’s exploration of the morphology of the psyche and its 
kinship with the Good. The last part of the analysis will deal with the answer Socrates provides to 
Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ challenge. Plato understands the calling to the Good as a human 
experience that compels man to an ethical standard. Plato sought to show that all men feel the 
tension towards the Good and that following its ethical standard is a matter not only of 
responsibility, but also of choice (617e). This is exemplified in the myth of Er, a Pamphylian, a 
man “of all tribes” (613b), who upon his death learned that virtue was a philosophical matter 
(619d). 
Finally, the last chapter will provide a summary of the analysis, the significance of the 











The debates regarding the interpretation of Plato’s Republic are as controversial as they are 
philosophically fascinating, for they mirror the current state of philosophical inquiry. Probably, 
one should start by wondering why Plato has captured so much attention in the past decades and 
why there is such a diversification of approaches. 
 Most of what is written on Plato’s Republic in the last century is to a great extent a 
response to Karl Popper’s accusations against Plato in his book The Open Society and its 
Enemies. Written during the Second World War, Popper’s book sought to expose Plato as an 
ideologue and one of the first totalitarian thinkers whose works represent a menace to liberal 
democracies and open societies in general.14 Scholars wishing to defend Plato had necessarily to 
face the fact that Plato was neither a liberal nor a democrat. It was then apparent that a new 
interpretative strategy had to be presented in which Plato could be rescued from such accusations. 
In North American academic circles, Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin are the most influential 
scholars who wished to vindicate Plato. They both argued that Popper’s interpretation of Plato 
was a result of the modern crisis of philosophical illiteracy.15 When philosophy started with 
Socrates, it was traditionally understood that philosophy was the pursuit of truth, namely, the 
pursuit of knowledge of all things, knowledge of what is. By traditionally, I mean an 
interpretation that understands Plato’s ontology to be partly “existentialist,” for it is concerned 
with ὄντα (being).16 In the Republic, this interpretation is based on Socrates’ claim that someone 
                                                        
14 Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 87. 
15 Leo Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, 1st ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
1988), 12; Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, ed. Gerhart Niemeyer (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1990), 7. 
16 The quotation marks on existentialist are in order because it should not be confused with modern existentialism as 
represented by Jean Paul Sartre or Albert Camus. Existentialism sustains that all philosophical thinking begins with 
the human subject, that is, with the conscious, thinking, acting, feeling, and living individual. Existentialism is 
characterized by a sense of absurdity, a sense of disorientation and confusion. See Robert C. Solomon, 
Existentialism, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1–2. Furthermore, existentialism is consistent 
and in favor of an atheist approach to existence. See James Wood’s introductory chapter in Sartre’s Nausea, trans. 
Robert Baldick (London: Penguin Classics, 2000). Existentialism understood in this manner is alien to Plato’s 
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who knows must know something that is, for it is not possible to know something that is not 
(476e-479e).17 To this extent, Plato is understood to be fundamentally a realist, that is, Plato 
understood reality to be one and knowable. In this sense, philosophy is the quest for the truth of 
being. The main representatives of the traditional interpretation previous to Strauss and Voegelin 
are A. E. Taylor and Paul Shorey.  
There are, of course, scholars that contest Socrates’ claim (476e-479e) to be partly 
“existentialist.” They are known as analytical philosophers. Gail Fine, for example, argues that 
the Republic does not present a realist epistemology structured on the distinction of different 
forms of being. For Fine, the difference between knowledge and opinion (doxa) does not rest in 
objects, but in prepositions about objects. 18 We will not further elaborate on these authors since 
they represent exactly what Strauss and Voegelin were trying to overcome. Instead, we will place 
the discussion in the dispute between Strauss and Voegelin as they are the major representatives 
of political philosophy. 
 
Strauss and his Influence 
 
Although the similarities between Strauss and Voegelin are strongest in their diagnosis of the 
modern crisis, their vindications of Plato point in two different directions. It is our contention that 
their point of departure rest on whether or not Plato should be read as a theist or an atheist, 
namely, whether Plato made an actual distinction between phenomenal and trans-phenomenal 
reality. Strauss does not recognize that Plato distinguishes two different modes of existence, that 
is, the world of Becoming (genesis) and the world of Being (ousia). Both, Strauss’ background 
and the issues that dominated his scholarly work, demonstrate that he did not believe that the 
pursuit of truth (philosophia) is compatible with transcendental reality, which he referred as the 
conflict between reason and revelation. From Strauss’ perspective, the yearning for God is man’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
experiences. Plato was indeed concerned with the acting and living person, but the world was not seen as absurd or 
voided of divine mystery. Plato was in fact looking for a standard. Thus, by “existentialist,” we simply mean that 
Plato is concerned with existence, with all being. See  Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 232. 
17 For a fuller account of this schematic picture, see Italian scholar Francesco Fronterotta, “Plato’s Republic in the 
Recent Debate,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48, no. 2 (2010): 125–51.  
18 Gail Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (Clarendon Press, 2003), 84.  
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deepest desire.19 Yet, a yearning does not constitute any proof of the existence of another plane of 
existence. This is, of course, a realization of reason, which, according to Strauss, has its origin in 
Socrates’ and Plato’s philosophia.20 Thus, as Stanley Rosen notes, Strauss “rejects metaphysics 
altogether.”21 
Strauss’ analysis of the Republic in The City and Man as well as his chapter on Plato in 
History of Political Philosophy confirm the assessment. From Strauss’ perspective, the Republic 
only means to bring to light the nature of political things.22 Strauss is correct to highlight that the 
dialogues intent to explore man as a political animal, but as we shall see, the exploration concerns 
the social existence of man vis-à-vis his relation with the Divine. Yet, throughout his analysis of 
the Republic, Strauss ignores Plato’s genuine concern for metaphysics, focusing solely on the 
political implications of the dialogue. For example, if we look at his interpretation of the 
“doctrine of ideas,” as he refers to it, ideas remain objects of the intellect, that is, categories of the 
“understanding.” What is transcendental about ideas is their impossibility to be embodied in 
phenomenal reality.23 In other words, there is nothing truly transcendental about them; they are 
just objects of thought. Note that this is partially the reason why Strauss deems the “ideal” city as 
impossible, for the pattern transcends history.24 In other words, the city cannot come into being 
because the city is just a city in speech.25 To this effect, for Strauss, the Republic is a work that is 
primarily political, that is, it is concerned only with the world of phenomena and not with 
transcendental reality.26  
  Strauss’ approach belongs to the so-called “dialogical approach,” which contends that the 
dialogues are dramas and hence they must be read as dramas.27 This interpretation starts by the 
recognition that Plato conceals himself completely behind his characters. As a result, it is not 
                                                        
19 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 55. 
20 See Letter 3 to Voegelin, November 24 1942, in: Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper, eds., Faith And Poltical 
Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964 (Columbia, Mo: University of 
Missouri, 2004), 7.  
21 Stanley Rosen, “The Theological Conflict Between Strauss and Voegelin,” in Faith And Poltical Philosophy: The 
Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964, ed. Peter Emberley and Barry Cooper 
(Columbia, Mo: University of Missouri, 2004), 266. 
22 Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1978), 138. 
23 Ibid., 118–120; Leo Strauss, “Plato,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, 3rd 
ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1987), 54. 
24 Strauss, The City and Man, 120. 
25 Ibid., 121. 
26 Of course, this appreciation of the Republic is not new and we can trace its origins to German Idealism. 
27 Strauss, The City and Man, 59. 
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possible to ascribe to Plato any particular position presented in the dialogue, not even Socrates’ 
position. To this effect, the Republic is an esoteric work and as such, in order to interpret it 
properly, it must be read by applying the law of logographic necessity, which assumes that every 
piece of the dialogue is deliberate and necessary.28 In addition, since the Republic is strictly a 
political work, Strauss sustains that it should be read alongside Aristophanes’ Clouds, for it 
brings out the esoteric and ironic features of Plato’s style.29 The Clouds is a work that satirizes 
Athenian democracy and when read together with the Republic, it shows that Plato was not 
serious about his provisions for the city in speech, that is, Plato is not suggesting an actual rule by 
philosopher kings. The city is impossible not simply because it is an object of thought, but 
because it goes against nature, specifically because “the claims of eros are simply silenced.”30 By 
eros, Strauss means specifically sexual appetitive, which, according to Strauss, is replaced with 
other drives such as patriotism, dedication to the common good, and justice.31 Thus, according to 
Strauss, the Republic, if properly interpreted, “conveys the broadest and deepest analysis of 
political idealism ever made.”32 The reduction of the “ideal” city to thought and irony allows 
Strauss to make an even more extraordinary claim. Given that the city cannot be because it goes 
against nature, it follows that democracy rises as the best actual regime that could be embodied in 
history.33 Thus, by reducing the city in speech to an object of thought and by reading it as an 
ironical political work, Strauss not only vindicates Plato from being a menace to open societies, 
but he also proposes a reading that makes the dialogue appealing to democrats. 
Strauss’ approach to the dialogue is interesting, particularly regarding his methodology. It 
cannot be denied that there has been contribution about how to properly read a dialogue. Strauss 
is absolutely correct to point that we cannot simply attribute to Plato any of the opinion of the 
dialogue without a due analysis of its totality. Yet, it is precisely in this point that we find 
Strauss’ analysis deficient. The Republic does illustrate a tension between truth and the poems of 
the poets, what Strauss might have identified as the tension between reason and revelation. But 
the dialogue does not expose a tension between reason and theology. If anything, the Republic 
                                                        
28 Ibid., 60. 
29 Ibid., 63. 
30 Ibid., 117.  
31 Ibid., 111. 
32 Ibid., 127. 
33 Ibid., 131. This conclusion rises from Strauss’ own comparison between the sequence of regimes in the Republic 
and Hesiod’s ages of the metals. Democracy comes closer to the golden age.  
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attempts to a theological revision that is in synch with reason, especially because it is the quality 
of reason to reach beyond the world of Becoming. In other words, Strauss has to prove that Plato 
himself limited the reach of reason to the world of Becoming, and that his works have nothing to 
do with transcendental reality. This is something that his analysis on the Republic did not 
establish. Thus, it is our assessment that the limits Strauss subscribes to reason are of a personal 
nature and that they show his own views on philosophia, which are alien to Plato’s.34  
Strauss’ followers include Allan Bloom, Seth Bernardete, Leon Craig, and Stanley Rosen. 
All of them agree that Plato was an esoteric philosopher who had some particular ethical and 
political teachings that cannot be explicitly found in the dialogue.35 Furthermore, they all agree 
with Strauss’ thesis that the Republic deliberately and ironically disregards features of the human 
condition and the differences between individuals, which places the argument concerning the 
ideal city against the forces of nature, hence emphasizing the irony of the project.36 We cannot 
help but agree with Strauss and Straussians that Plato’s provisions for the “ideal” city are 
extreme. But the irony of the project cannot be proven by this reason alone, nor even by reading 
the dialogue along lines consistent with Aristophanes’ Clouds. Socrates is explicit about the 
feasibility of the “ideal” city several times (499b; 502c) and his distinction between theory and 
practice does not render the argument ironic (473a). Socrates is again explicit that he was trying 
to describe how a good city could come to be. This does not mean that it could not happen, but 
rather that, if it happens, it will not be exactly the same, but close enough. Perhaps, Straussians 
would have less difficulty in understanding Plato’s provisions for the “ideal” city if they would 
not try to make the dialogue more political than it actually is. As we shall see, Voegelin rightly 
points out that the dialogue is not concerned with political opinions, but rather with a sublime 
experience of ascent. The argument in the Republic is not trying to convey some “truths” about 
political systems and, to this extent, regarding it as a critique on political ideology obfuscates the 
experiences expressed in the symbolism.  
                                                        
34 We will develop Plato’s view on philosophia on the analysis of the dialogue. 
35 Seth Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 1–
5; Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1991), xviii; Leon Harold Craig, The War 
Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic (University of Toronto Press, 1996), xxiii; Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Republic: A 
Study (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 2. 
36 Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, 125; Bloom, The Republic Of Plato, 381; Craig, The War Lover, 217; Rosen, 
Plato’s Republic, 5. 
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Inspired by the “dialogical approach,” a group of scholars in the early 1990s argued that it 
was necessary to take this interpretation a step further. They believed that scholars such as 
Strauss “continued to believe that the drama was subordinated to the philosophy and that the 
drama exists as a corroborative adornment to reinforce the arguments.”37 Among these scholars 
we find James A. Arieti and Geral A. Press, both arguing that the philosophy must be 
subordinated to the drama, namely the dialogues are dramas and not merely dramatic.38 Arieti 
understands the Republic to be a literary work meant to attract students to the Academy.39 For 
Arieti, Plato is telling his audience that the Republic is an imitation itself and should not be taken 
to be a true reflection of the idea of justice. The imitation must be replaced with a real discussion; 
Plato is inviting us to engage in active philosophy ourselves.40 Arieti argues that the dialogue 
shows the repercussions of the extreme Socratic life teaching us to strive for a mean between the 
active life of politics and philosophy.41 
Press has a similar thesis to Arieti’s. He also understands the dialogues to be encouraging 
philosophical activity rather than particular philosophical doctrines or beliefs.42 In fact, Press 
argues that the central questions in the dialogues are “moral, ethical and political, rather than 
questions of logic, epistemology and metaphysics.”43 Press believes that Plato did not mean to 
divide reality into two realms utterly separated from each other so as to make various true 
statements.44 The Republic shows a vision, that is, a particular way of understanding the world 
about lower and higher lives, the philosophical one being the best kind of life.45 Furthermore, 
Press argues that Plato understood philosophy to be intellectual and moral, theoretical and 
practical. The Republic is, for example, a theoretical work since it makes us think about moral 
concepts.46 
                                                        
37 James A. Arieti, Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama (Savage, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
1991), 11. 
38  James A. Arieti, “Plato’s Philosophical Antiope: The Gorgias,” in Plato’s Dialogues: New Studies & 
Interpretations, by Gerald A. Press (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993), 197. 
39 Arieti, Interpreting Plato, 231. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Arieti, “Plato’s Philosophical Antiope: The Gorgias,” 214. 
42 Gerald A. Press, Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed, Guides for the Perplexed (London ; New York: Continuum, 
2007), 150. 
43 Ibid., 152. 
44 Ibid., 163. 
45 Press, Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed, 170. 
46 Press, Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed, 173. 
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Arieti and Press should receive some merit for recognizing that the dialogue is best 
understood when placed in its historical context. However, they not only suffer from the same 
deficiency of Strauss’ interpretation, but they also lack philosophical insight. The subordination 
of philosophy to drama makes Plato a poet rather than a philosopher. Of course, Plato was a poet 
in the sense that he used poetry to express his insights. But poetry is merely a tool of 
communication to express his philosophical experience. Plato’s object was not the production of 
a philosophical work, namely, a book. The Republic is not philosophy. For Plato, a philosopher 
may or may not write. Socrates did not write a word. For Plato, philosophy is the turning around 
of the soul towards the Good (521c). Philosophy is an act of living people, whose goal is the 
ascent toward the Good. In contrast, the object of poetry is the expression of an experience, 
which may or may not be concerned with the Good. Likewise, Arieti’s and Press’ interpretation 
reduce philosophy to discussion, completely stripping philosophia from its directional intent. 
Philosophy is no longer the pursuit for truth, but rather the questioning of it. Note how this is a 
result of an atheist approach to Plato.  
 
Voegelin and Psychological Approaches 
 
Voegelin took a more traditional approach to defend the Republic from Popper’s accusations. By 
traditional, I mean that Voegelin did not argue that Plato was being ironical about the ideal city.47 
Voegelin rather sought to understand the predominant role that Plato attributed to the psuchê. 
Like Strauss, Voegelin realizes that Plato differentiates reason from the experiences of faith and 
trust (pistis), as well as, from experiences of love (philia, erôs).48 Yet, Voegelin recognizes that it 
is precisely because of the love for truth that Plato distinguishes between the world of Becoming 
and the world of Being.49 Voegelin notes that it became imperative for Plato to remove that 
source of the order from the cosmos since it is a philosophical necessity.50  Thus, Voegelin 
understands that a proper reading of Plato is one that does not try to make Plato an atheist, but 
rather recognizes that, for Plato, the dissociation of the cosmos from the Good is a question of 
                                                        
47 Unlike Strauss, Voegelin did not distant himself from traditional interpretations of Plato such as A. E. Taylor and 
Paul Shorey 
48 Voegelin, Anamnesis, 97. 
49 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:332. 
50 Voegelin, Anamnesis, 78.  
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reason (not of faith). The psuchê is then attributed a paramount role precisely because it shows 
man his relation with the Divine. From this follows, that any reading of Plato as an atheist, 
ultimately misinterprets the overall meaning of the dialogue.  
 Voegelin’s analysis of the Republic has not become very influential in certain circles. 
Probably, the main the reason for Voegelin’s unpopularity is that academia has developed 
distaste for studies that consider the experience of the Divine as a serious matter.51 This thesis 
will try to remedy that by following Voegelin’s approach, which will be further developed in the 
theoretical framework. Meanwhile, it must be recognize that Voegelin is not the only scholar who 
recognized that Plato gave a predominant role to the psuchê. The centrality of the soul in Plato’s 
Republic has prompted some scholars to disregard the political considerations of the dialogue and 
focus on the ethical and psychological sphere. Giovanni R. F. Ferrari argues that it is better to 
think of the Republic as work of moral philosophy, for Plato explicitly subordinates politics to the 
human soul.52 Ferrari also believes that regarding the Republic primarily as a political work lends 
itself to fascist interpretations since one is required to classify its political stance.53 There is, of 
course, for Ferrari a genuine political interest in the Republic, but no direct link between the 
political thought and individual ethics.54 In other words, for Ferrari, the Republic is more of a 
work on human psychology, which introduces an analogy between the city and the psyche. 
 Ferrari’s approach is interesting to us to the extent that he is quite right to point out that 
there is a psychological interest in Plato. What is more, he is also correct to highlight that the 
dialogue is build on Socrates’ assumption than the city is the soul written large. Yet, Ferrari’s 
approach understands the assumption as a proportional metaphor, that is, as an analogy between 
city and soul.55 However, Plato never uses the world analogos when referring to the assumption 
that the city is the soul written large (351e; 369a; 432b; 434d-e; 435b; 441c; 445c; 472c-d; 541b; 
543-544a; 548d; 553a; 558c; 571a; 577c-d; 605b; 608a-b). And yet, this world (analogos) is used 
when Socrates intents to elucidate the Good by comparing it to the sun. Why is this? We can only 
assume that Plato did mean the comparison of the Good and sun as analogy, whereas he did not 
                                                        
51 See Patrick Johnston, “Silence Is Not Always Golden: Investigating the Silence Surrounding the Thought of Eric 
Voegelin,” Voegeliniana, Occasional Papers, no. 72 (October 2008). 
52  G. R. F. Ferrari, “Introduction,” in The Republic, by Plato, trans. Tom Griffith (Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), xxiii. 
53 Ibid. 
54 G. R. F. Ferrari, City and Soul in Plato’s Republic (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 89. 
55 Ferrari, “Introduction,” 59. 
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mean that the city is the soul written large as an analogy. As we shall see, Socrates’ assumption, 
that the city is the soul written large, is not an analogy per se, but rather an anthropological 
principle, that is, an assumption about man’s mode of existence. Thus, treating Socrates’ 
assumption as an analogy produces errors in the interpretation of the dialogue. For example, 
Ferrari ignores any reference to metaphysics in the dialogue, making the work merely 
psychological.  
 Another scholar that recognizes the centrality of the soul in the Republic is Julia Annas. 
She takes a more radical stand than Ferrari and dismisses completely the political arguments in 
the Republic, for they are so extreme that they are not worth of any political consideration.56 
Instead, Plato’s intentions are to define the conditions of an ethic of the just, in terms of virtue 
and happiness, as to allow the soul to reproduce the harmony of the ideal city, which is only an 
example.57 Plato’s ethical thought is then “structured by a broad eudaimonist assumption.”58 
Furthermore, the Republic is an ethical dialogue “structured as an answer to the question, how 
one ought to live (Republic 344e).”59 For Plato, one ought to be virtuous because only then can 
one be happy. Being virtuous is having an ordered soul. Having an ordered soul is being like a 
god, which reveals the insignificance of the human life.60  
 We agree with Annas that the dialogue is structured to answer an ethical question. Yet, for 
Annas, the search for the answer is limited to the world of Becoming. In fact, the forms, as 
objects of thought, have reference only to phenomena.61 In other words, there is no knowledge 
beyond phenomena, which again portrays Plato as atheist. It must be stressed that Annas’ 
analysis excels when compared to other approaches since she appreciates the realism in Plato’s 
work, that is, happiness is dealt in the Republic as a concrete phenomenon. However, because 
Plato is read as an atheist, Annas finds the ending of the dialogue lame and messy.62 Again, as we 
shall see, there is nothing messy or awkward about Plato’s Republic if one does not choose to 
assume that Plato was an atheist. 
                                                        
56 Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 91. 
57 Julia Annas, “Plato’s Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Plato, by Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 283. 
58 Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, 269. 
59 Annas, “Plato’s Ethics,” 272. 
60 Ibid., 278. 
61 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford : New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), 236–238. 







We have previously mentioned two main assumptions when approaching the Republic. First, we 
must reject interpretations of Plato that have been greatly influenced by Kant, for Plato was not a 
modern thinker and he did not restrict reason as modern thinkers do today. For Plato, the mind 
has the ability to know the truth. In the classical sense, truth (alêtheia) means what is, what 
exists.63 This essentially means that Plato was concerned with existence.64 Thus, this thesis will 
adopt an “existentialist” approach to textual interpretation, which assumes that Plato’s objective 
was to clarify existence through dialectics.65 The assumption is that the dialogue is not concerned 
with concepts and opinions per se, but rather with experiences, in particularly, with our common 
experience of being human. The only way we can communicate, explain, and explore our 
experiences is by discussing them. Moreover, as a philosophical work, the dialogue is not simply 
concerned with inducing dialogue about these experiences, but also with truth (alêtheia) about 
existence. The discussion aims at discovering what these experiences tell us about reality, that is, 
about us, about the cosmos, and all things.  
Now, if Plato’s intentions were so, if Plato wanted to clarify existence, there must be 
concord and reciprocity of both the content and the dialogue form. As D. C. Schindler rightly 
points out, we ought to expect that “the content determines the form and the form reflects the 
content.”66 Of course, such an approach is not limited to Platonic dialogues, but rather it is 
concerned with knowing how to read. Most books are moderately easy to read and both content 
                                                        
63 Initially, as found in Homer, alêtheia meant truth as opposed to lie (Iliad, 24.407). After Homer, it also meant 
reality as opposed to appearance. It meant what exists, what is. See for example, Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, 
2.41; Plato’s Statesman, 300c; Xenophon’s Memorabilia, 2.1.27; Aristotle’s Politics, 1278b33. Alêtheia developed 
the meaning of reality since truth about reality is subordinated to truth as reality. 
64 We are arguing that Plato’s ontology is concerned with ὄντα (being). This interpretation is based on Socrates’ 
claim about knowledge in 476e-479e.  
65 Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 232. 
66 D. C. Schindler, Plato’s Critique of Impure Reason: On Goodness and Truth in the Republic (Washington, D.C: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 28. 
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and form are relatively evident. However, the greatest works of mankind such as Plato’s 
dialogues are not as accessible, for the content concerns authentic consciousness of being. 
Consciousness of being is an experience that man has by virtue of his reason when he 
becomes fully aware of his existence. Man starts consciously exploring his experiential life, that 
is, man inquires into the origin, the meaning, and the purpose of his existence.67 The experience 
is, of course, a historical development. It concerns the evolution of man as man, and particularly 
with his psychological development. By evolution, I mean simply change according to the 
environment, which is its scientific meaning, rather than progress.68 Consciousness of being can 
be traced in history, especially because it is the foundation for different cultures.69 For example, 
think of the multiplicity of cultures and how representations of the gods vary across history.  
Voegelin’s life work is concerned precisely with how man has come to understand 
himself in the world throughout history. Voegelin understands that consciousness of being is 
motivated by an experience of inadequacy.70 Man finds himself dissatisfied. He is alienated, 
namely, separated from that which he truly desires. Man realizes that he is always yearning and 
in constant quest for fulfillment. In other words, man becomes conscious of erôs, and thus, it is 
this force that prompts man to inquire about existence. The inquiry could lead man to realize that, 
regardless of his own mortality, what he truly desires is not finite. Ultimate fulfillment can only 
be found in the Beyond, in the everlasting world, in eternity.71 Thus, the exploration of erôs can 
lead to another experience, the experience of the Divine. Note that what is common is the 
experience of erôs, whether it is a conscious or an unconscious experience, man is at odds with 
himself. Man is always yearning. This yearning cannot be satiated. It is always with us and never 
really leaves us. The exploration of this experience can lead to the experience of the Divine, 
which can be experienced in a multiplicity of ways. For example, consider again the differences 
                                                        
67 Eric Voegelin, “The Beginning and the Beyond,” in What Is History? And Other Late Unpublished Writings, ed. 
Thomas Hollweck and Paul Caringella (Baton Rouge: University of Missouri, 1990), 174. 
68 Brian K. Hall and Benedikt Hallgrímsson, Strickberger’s Evolution, 4th ed. (Sudbury, Mass: Jones & Bartlett 
Learning, 2007), 4–5. 
69 Note that this is not a linear understanding of history. By arguing that consciousness of being can be traced in 
history, we simply mean that we can study cultures and the way people understood themselves within these cultures. 
Now, because man evolves psychologically, it does not mean that he stops being a man. Our interest is how this 
common experience of being a man is understood differently through history.   
70 Voegelin, “The Beginning and the Beyond,” 170. 
71 To be sure, the Republic is not a dialogue that suggest ultimate fulfillment in the Beyond. A communion with God 
that stops all yearning is a Christian striving rather than a Platonic one. Yet, in several of the Platonic dialogues, 
Socrates does speak of an afterlife that is greater and more fulfilling. In the Republic, good souls will enjoyed a 
blessed existence in heaven before returning to earth (614d-616a).  
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between the representations of gods across history and cultures. Each of those representations is a 
particular experience.  
To this extent, this approach to interpretation understands the Republic as a symbol of 
Plato’s exploration of existence. The whole dialogue is itself a symbol of Plato’s experience of 
reality. Plato does not present doctrines or opinions, but rather he presents artistically something 
of his own experience about the nature of reason (nous) and of reasoning, and its kinship with the 
Divine. Thus, Plato tried to recreate the nature of his experience so that it might be grasps by 
others. As Friedländer explains, Plato “had caught sight of the Eidos, and was then confronted 
with the task of making his intuition permanently visible through the Logos.”72 Friedländer is 
quite correct to point out the experience, that is, the insight into the Good as determinant of 
Plato’s intentions. Yet, intuition might not be the best word choice, for what Plato saw is akin to 
reason (nous) and was the result of conscious reasoning. Through conscious reasoning, Plato had 
become aware not simply of erôs, but of Being. This is the particular experience that Plato sought 
to convey. The common experience of erôs becomes fully conscious to Plato as a call to Being. 
As illustrated in several of his dialogues, erôs led Plato to inquire about alêtheia, which resulted 
in the discovery of the Good, the source of order and all being. As Cushman argues, Plato’s 
thought is “properly made by way of his interpretation of man, man whose rational existence is in 
jeopardy because he is divorced from the ground of Being despite the telltale signs of his 
essential kinship with it.”73 
This brings us to our second assumption. As we have seen, the “existentialist” approach 
can take two different directions concerning the nature of existence. Either we approach the 
dialogue assuming that Plato was an atheist, namely, that he thought that reality only engulfed the 
world of phenomena (including abstract thoughts). Or we assume that Plato was not only 
concerned with the world of phenomena, but that he had a genuine concern for trans-phenomenal 
reality. In other words, should Plato be approached as an atheist or as a theist? Our contention is 
that Plato should be approached as a theist. Now, it might appear as if the distinction is creating a 
false dichotomy between atheism and theism. It could be argued that there is a way in which 
Plato could be read as neither, that is, as an agnostic. However, such an approach assumes that 
                                                        
72 Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 25. The choice of word could be attributed to Meyerhoff since Friedländer did 
not write in English.  
73 Cushman, Therapeia, xvi. 
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reason cannot tell whether or not God, the Divine, or the supernatural exists, which bring us back 
again to the Kantian tradition. What is primordial is that we understand that theism does not 
mean certainty about the Divine. It only means that if we trust the exigencies of reason, they 
drive us to the existence of God. If we choose to be suspicious of reason and its capacities, then 
reality is unknowable or limited to phenomena. This might be the case. We are not arguing that 
Plato had certainty of the Divine or that God existed. We are simply assuming that Plato was not 
suspicious of reason as modern thinkers are. Now, this assumption should not be mistaken for a 
Christian reading of Plato. Instead, it should be understood as a logical deduction from the 
evidence at hand. To start, Plato’s God is distant, namely, it does not get involved in history. God 
is just the source of order. Moreover, while man yearns for God (erôs), God does not love man 
(agapê). These are crucial distinctions that can only be understood when the dialogue is read in 
its specific historical context. To this effect, we argue that Plato’s Republic gains it specific 
meaning in the historical situation of Athens as well as in the “intellectual” background of 
philosophers that preceded Plato such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Parmenides. All these will 
be further explored in the analysis. 
Clearly, the main weakness of the approach is that in seeking to explain Plato’s insights, 
we run into the difficulty of reifying them. For example, Plato sought to elevate the experience of 
dissatisfaction to a standard, that is, the Good. The Good is itself an experience and not an idea or 
object of thought. Put differently, Plato did not think the Good to be a necessary concept on 
which to build a theory of ethics. On the contrary, Plato experienced himself being drawn to the 
Good and tried to show that not only all men share the experience, but they all have the moral 
responsibility to conform to it. In modern times, reification might be harder to overcome, for we 
live in a time of idealism (we are mostly concerned with ideas and concepts). As explained 
earlier, Plato was not a modern philosopher and he did not set the same limits on reason as do 
modern thinkers. Plato’s writings seek to communicate an experience that did not arise from 
conceptual construction. Plato was not concerned with a place in the history of ideas.  
Whilst not concerned with conceptualizations, an approach based on experience cannot 
prevent them from arising. Concepts are necessary for expressing experiences. However, 
concepts are merely tools and not the focus; the focus should always remain on the common 
experience of human yearning. Plato makes this explicit in the Republic by suggesting that 
excessive rigidity in the choice of terms is unworthy, for what really matters is the object of 
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investigation, the love for the source of being (533c-e). Thus, the only way to avoid rectification 
is to be very aware that we are not dealing with concepts, but with concrete realities, in this case, 
the experience of being. Of course, this is not to say, for example, that Plato’s characters are 
concrete realities. They are abstractions, somewhat based on realities, that speak to our 
experiential life.74 Plato sought to encourage his readers to explore life by making them relate to 
the characters through their own experiences. The dialogue aims at making the readers fully 
conscious of their own experience of being. 
The main strength of this approach is that, in identifying the experience of being as 
central to Plato’s thought, one must try to understand who we are as human beings, particularly 
because this experience is unique to man.  In other words, in other to join the conversation of the 
dialogue, one must take an honest look within oneself. Paradoxical as it may seem, this thesis 
argues that one of the main reasons Plato has been greatly misinterpreted in the past decades is 
because modern man does not understand who he is or what he wants. Modern man does not 
understand his erotic nature as yearning for the Divine. Modern man is numbed to any experience 
of the Divine. He is convinced that he has been socialized into theist beliefs. Thus, he embraces 
skepticism and modern science to free himself from these bonds. The result is a new form of 
socialization, an atheist one, and more often than not, an anti-theist one, that closes all doors to 
experiences of transcendence, including those experiences that took place over a thousand years 








                                                        
74 Socrates and his interlocutors are historical figures that impersonate a stereotype of the different ways of life. Of 
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The analysis presents five subdivisions following Eric Voegelin’s organization of the Republic.75 
Voegelin’s analysis provides a rich historical account that focuses on the motivating experiences 
behind Plato’s argument for the right order of man and society. I will focus on how the search for 
order is ultimately the ordering of man’s striving, thus putting erôs in the spotlight. The purpose 
is to show that the Republic is also a dialogue about erôs inasmuch as the question “what is 
justice?” finds its origins and its answer there. It is in this dialogue that Plato finds his voice by 




The Republic opens with an elaborate symbolic scene that sets the foundations for the discussion 
of justice. The opening scene resembles that of the Symposium, Plato’s dialogue on erôs. Both 
settings are harbor towns, the Piraeus and the Phaleron. In both scenes, characters are walking 
toward Athens and, in both scenes, these characters are detained by someone calling from behind, 
asking them to stop (Rep. 327b; Symp. 172a). However, unlike the Symposium, the Republic does 
not unfold in Athens. Socrates descends to the Piraeus and stays there among his friends. The 
Piraeus is a symbol of Hades, for the goddess to whom Socrates offers his prayers is Bendis, 
known by the Athenians as the chthonian Hecate who looks after the souls on their way to the 
underworld.76 The richness in symbolism rests in the fact that, from the very beginning of the 
dialogue, Plato presents us with at least three aspects of human existence. First, we have the 
symbols of ascent and descent, that is, a direction toward life or death. Second, descending or 
ascending is portrayed as a matter of choice. Socrates chooses to descend and ascend (328b). 
                                                        
75 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:100. 
76 Ibid., 3:108. 
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Likewise, the prologue presents us with the equality of man before death, since Socrates finds the 
festival for the goddess of the underworld to be equal in splendor to those of the Athenians 
(327a). The relation between choice and ascent and the equality of man is brought to light at the 
end of the dialogue with the myth of Er. For the time being, what is important to remark is that 
Socrates’ descent is significant insofar as he is presented as the rescuer of his companions, for the 
scene symbolizes the human condition as it were about our existing in Hades. Man is an 
apparently damned creature whose existence is destined to darkness. A careful reader will find 
that the symbolism at the opening of the Republic expresses the depth of Plato’s preoccupation, 
for the prologue poses a question that runs through the whole dialogue: Can man find a way out 
of the underworld?  
In light of this question, the search for justice takes on a meaning quite beyond a 
competition for the best argument or the most accurate definition. Socrates and his interlocutors, 
particularly Glacon and Adeimantus, are in the search for clarity within darkness. Now, the above 
question may be as well followed by another question:  why is it that man seeks a way out of 
darkness? As rhetorical as it may seem, Plato took this question very seriously. The direction of 
the striving matters. This becomes apparent also by the timing in which the conversation takes 
place, for it starts late in the afternoon and lasts until dawn. Thus, if we pay attention to the 
gradual transformation of the symbols across the dialogue, we will find that they express and 
define Plato’s own experience of ascent. Plato descends to the underworld, as everyone does, and 
he is chained in the cave, as everyone else. Yet, he is not held by darkness. Plato finds Socrates, 
the torchbearer who will show him the way up to life. The experience is described as a matter of 
choice and as the achievement of authentic consciousness of being, that is, as the recognition of a 
common humanity that speaks of the station of man in the order of things as well as the 
responsibility of such a realization.  
The rich complexity of the symbolism in the opening scene is characteristic of Plato’s 
undisputable talent as a poet. It is not a straightforward instruction and it must be interpreted 
within the totality of the dialogue as well as within the intricate historical circumstances. Plato 
himself was not oblivious of this, for the opening scene is followed by three verbal exchanges 
that mean to provide the context that motivated Plato’s ascent. To this extent, in order to 
appreciate Plato’s construction of the Republic, it is imperative to understand the historical 
context in which it was written. When Plato sat to write the Republic around 380 B.C., Athens 
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had undergone traumatic experiences. In 404 B.C., the city fell after almost thirty years of war 
between the Greek states. The Golden Age of Athens, a period of Athenian political supremacy, 
economic prosperity, and cultural flourishing that lasted throughout the fifth century, culminated 
in the darkest tragedy of the Ancient world. Athens will never recover from such a calamity. The 
disaster had repercussions far beyond the political, for the morale of Athenians was nearly 
destroyed. 77  Sparta had not only demonstrated its military superiority, but acute minds 
understood that Spartan self-discipline and rigorous education largely contributed to their 
victory.78 Athenian customs were depreciated, which enabled the cruel and oppressive rule of the 
Thirty Tyrants, a pro-Spartan oligarchy. Of course, this was a reactionary regime, the result of an 
immediate reaction that did not last more than thirteen months. However, not two years later, 
after the Thirty were expelled, democracy was restored, and amnesty proclaimed, the catastrophe 
was neither solved nor forgotten. It could not be ignored that, during the war, internal conflicts, 
including treason (i.e. Alcibiades), had been the order of the day. Once Socrates, the 
personification of justice, was executed, it was evident to any intelligent and sensible citizen that 
the fall of Athens was due to moral corruption. 79  As Voegelin points out, Socrates was 
condemned by Athens and the gods condemned Athens for it.80 The blow struck so deep that it is 
in this period that Athenians first started to turn inwards; they started to reflect about their actions 
and their values. What happened to Athens? There is probably no other time in history were there 
was such a conscious effort to restore education and culture and to bring back the values that 
once made Athens the greatest city-state in the world.81  
Having this historical background in mind, we must understand that Plato seeks to 
determine the causes that brought along the decline of Athens as well as to provide a potential 
solution.82 In the Republic, Plato’s analysis of the downfall starts with a conversation between 
Socrates and Cephalus. This first conversation follows and clarifies the symbolism of the opening 
scene, since it also starts with allusions to erôs and Hades as old Cephalus reflects on the life of 
passions and his imminent descent to the underworld (329d-330e). Plato portrays Cephalus as 
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someone that is genuinely anxious about the consequences of unjust actions. Cephalus is 
sincerely trying to makes things right in the way that he believes is best. From oral tradition, 
Cephalus has learned that, given man’s affections, self-discipline and moderation are key factors 
to living a happy and just life.83 Socrates admires Cephalus’ observation that it is only self-
discipline and moderation that make both old age and youth manageable since unrestrained 
desires will make life difficult to bear either in old age or in youth (329d). What is more, 
Cephalus also understands that wealth does not mitigate man’s yearning (330a). Yet, Cephalus is 
of the opinion that wealth has an important role to play if one wishes to follow one’s better 
judgment, since he understands (quite literally) that justice is telling the truth and paying your 
debts (331b).  
The scene with Cephalus is most interesting to us for two reasons. First, the conversation 
about justice does not begin in a vacuum, but it arises out of a concrete situation.84 Philosophical 
discourse does not take place in an abstraction from actual experiences. Instead, philosophical 
discourse is a discussion about real and concrete experiences. Second, the discussion about how 
to live correctly arises from the fact that man is an erotic creature. For if man were not an erotic 
being, there would be no need to inquire into the most satisfying way to live. Thus, one must 
follow Plato’s insights and remark that the conversation about the nature of justice starts as a 
conversation about man’s erotic existence (329d). If man is innately drawn to light, Plato 
thought, man must find the best way of life that leads him out of darkness. Only a way of life that 
strives toward light can truly satisfy man. The old generation, represented by Cephalus, seems 
not to be completely oblivious of this. Undeniably, Cephalus understands man to be an erotic 
creature, which is essentially what prompts man to wrongdoing. He also understands that living a 
just life is the best way to live a satisfactory life. Nevertheless, Cephalus’ assessment about life is 
unreflective. Cephalus had no previous need to become conscious about the reality of justice vis-
à-vis the erotic nature of man. He does not question or understand the reasons for tradition. He 
follows the rules blindly as most respected men do because otherwise society would disintegrate 
into chaos. Cephalus is just out of habit. This becomes evident when he suggests that wealth 
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prevents people from cheating other people as well as it allows for due sacrifices.85 Accordingly, 
a poor man could not pursue justice successfully. Here, the contrast with Socrates is evident. 
Socrates is poor, probably in debt, and yet also in pursuit of justice. If wealth is a factor for living 
a just life, how can Socrates pursue justice successfully? The issue must be further explored. But 
Cephalus seems to be too old and fragile to follow Socrates in this endeavor and hence his 
firstborn Polemarchus inherits the discussion. 
Polemarchus joins the conversation so as to rescue his father’s understanding of justice, 
which he translates as helping your friends and harming your enemies (332d). He is able to 
deduce such an understanding from Simonides’ and Homer’s poems (334b). To be sure, 
Polemarchus is more enlightened than his father as he immediately brings to our attention the 
authority of the poets. Let us explain why. When Cephalus greets Socrates, he is quick to remark 
that, unlike before, he has now developed a taste for speeches (328d). In other words, Cephalus 
has spent most of his life accumulating wealth without paying attention to his education. By 
contrast, Polemarchus seems to have received an education equivalent to noble young Athenians, 
for he is a close friend of Adeimantus. It is not by accident that they happened to be gathered at 
Cephalus’ home. Polemarchus not only heard the epic poems, but he has had time to discuss them 
or, at the very least, to listen to the speeches of others. Let us not forget that Thrasymachus, a 
known Sophist, is present in the crowd.  
Now, since Polemarchus is actually advocating for his father’s position, it would be a 
mistake to think that he is presenting a completely different understanding of justice. The 
difference between Cephalus and his primogeniture is that Polemarchus’ opinion is more 
rhetorical than experiential. Polemarchus is certainly a practical fellow; he does not talk about the 
moderation of desires or Hades. If Cephalus had barely any understanding of man’s erotic nature, 
Polemarchus has none. Given that his father was just out of habit, there was no conscious 
appreciation of justice that was passed down to Polemarchus. He was left in a vacuum that was 
filled with a diluted understanding of justice as well as rhetorical justifications. We can 
appreciate by his intervention that Polemarchus has been already exposed to corruptive 
influences when he assesses that justice is good for business (333a). Thus, Polemarchus 
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represents the new generation, those who were raised by an older generation that, given its 
unreflective righteousness, had little to contribute to their education. The result is a generation 
that has reduced justice to business ethics. Polemarchus does not seem to be bothered at all with 
his father’s concerns, namely, the moderation of desires or punishment in the afterlife. There is 
not even a blind respect for tradition, but rather it is attributed a value because it serves other 
purposes. It is unclear whether Polemarchus thinks that not acting justly can lead the city into 
chaos. What is clear, though, is that Polemarchus thinks that justice is good in order to profit.  
Plato has now identified the first cause that brought along the collapse of Athens. The old 
generation has failed to properly cultivate virtue (aretê) in the new generation. Given that the old 
generation lived in times of affluence, they rarely had to exercise moderation and restrain, which 
turned righteousness into a habit. The result is a younger generation that is not adequately 
educated in matter of right and wrong, which ultimately leads them to trivialize justice. The 
decay from one generation to another is best illustrated in Book VIII when the kallipolis, the best 
of the four cities, succumbs precisely because of neglect in education (546d). To be sure, this is a 
historical portrait, for it is concerned with the state of the core values of the Hellenes. Plato seeks 
to show that the lack of self-awareness in the old generation has partially contributed to the 
deterioration of the values that once brought order to Athens. The foundations of order have been 
left vulnerable. This becomes evident with Thrasymachus’ intervention. Yet, the scene with 
Polemarchus draws a picture in which justice can still be rescued with moderate effort. Even if 
Polemarchus’ upbringing lacked in substance, he is capable of following Socrates. Thus far, the 
state of justice in Attica does not seem to be a lost cause given that Socrates challenges 
Polemarchus with one simple assumption: justice is good and hence it must produce good things 
(335d). Polemarchus does not contest Socrates’ assumption since he still thinks that justice must 
be good. Given this assumption, it cannot simply be that justice is helping your friends and 
harming your enemies (332d). Even Homer seems to be mistaken because this description of 
justice reduces the just man as someone capable of deceit (334b).86 Moreover, how are we to 
differentiate with all certainty friends from enemies? (334d). No, justice cannot be a function of 
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war, not even of just war. Besides, given that it is ultimately necessary to differentiate between 
friends from enemies, justice is an art that requires knowledge, which renders justice as matter of 
expertise (334b-335a). At this point of the dialogue, although Socrates does not explicitly say it 
yet, we can already deduce that justice must be a function of goodness and one must know how 
to differentiate between good and bad. 
The miraculous fortune of having Socrates clarifying misunderstandings about justice is 
soon eclipsed by Thrasymachus’ abrupt and violent interruption. He is appalled by the way 
Socrates is directing the conversation, for he thinks that they are all acting like idiots giving way 
to one another (366b). Thrasymachus does not expect such nonsense from such a distinguished 
crowd and especially not from Socrates (366d). Therefore, after some much needed persuasion, 
he proceeds to enlighten them about the essence of justice. Thrasymachus’ claim about justice is 
well known; justice is the advantage of the stronger (338b). As Thrasymachus explains, the 
strength of the rulers springs from the realization that what is just is in their advantage (339d-e). 
Thus, good judgment is precisely achieving such a level of consciousness (348d). This is wisdom 
and virtue, knowing the truth about justice and acting accordingly (348d-e). In this sense, the 
weak are oblivious about how things truly are, because if they would learn the truth, they would 
soon realize that being just is not only very high-minded simplicity, but that the life of crime is 
better and more profitable (348c).   
Plato has now identified the second source of the problem, the Sophist. During its Golden 
Age, Athens attracted prominent teachers because it provided good opportunities for 
employment, particularly for those who were good at public speaking and debate. Sophists taught 
mostly young statesmen, nobility, and people who could afford their wages. The Sophists were 
not a school of thought; they were individuals of various types in search of fame and fortune who 
taught music, language, history, mathematics, science, and particularly rhetoric. In general, 
however, they claimed to teach aretê (virtue or excellence).87 Now, in order to understand the 
novelty of the movement, we must first understand that, in the Hellas, before the dawn of the 
Sophists, the state itself was considered to be the primary educational institution shaping young 
citizens, since there were no secondary schools or universities.88 What these young statesmen 
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learned was the established law, a priceless heritage of ancestral, or even divine wisdom.89 Until 
that time, “it had been tacitly acknowledged that those customs and laws embodied an absolute 
obligation, beyond dispute.”90 It was not until the arrival of Sophists that they were first explicitly 
challenged. To conservative minds, especially the elder citizens, the questioning of basic 
assumptions presented a threat to the whole structure of society.  And when Athens fell, Plato 
was not alone in denouncing the detrimental influence of the Sophists. However, Plato’s reasons 
were quite unlike the accusations that ultimately convicted Socrates, who was also suspected of 
being a sophist.91 Plato was not against the probing into the values of the city. On the contrary, 
following his teacher footsteps, Plato thought that if the young generation wanted to question and 
discuss the customs and the laws of the city, in essence, to question the way they were living, 
they should be allowed to do it as a means of encouraging their education. This is, for example, 
revealed by Socrates’ reaction after Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ speeches (367e). Socrates is 
delighted with the brothers precisely because, despite their severe speeches on justice, they 
remain eager to hear Socrates come in its defense. Socrates is pleased with the brothers precisely 
because there is nothing virtuous in being just out of habit and submission. 
Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, all of whom did not have the Sophists in high esteem, 
provided most of what we know about them. The lack of sophistic writings has led recent 
scholarship to question the accuracy of these writings. Some scholars has gone as far as to accuse 
Plato of having “discredited two generations of some of the world’s most brilliant and innovative 
thinkers, largely because –like most modern philosophers– they declined to accept a transcendent 
reality and were aware of potential disjunctions between words and things.” 92  Now, this is 
certainly fudging Plato’s concerns. Plato did not have a reactionary attitude toward the Sophists 
as some of his contemporaries did. Plato penetrated in the issue far deeper than any of his 
contemporaries, providing concrete evidence to corroborate his uneasiness. Thus, if we do not 
assume that Plato’s intentions are to simply distort and exaggerate their character as to champion 
his own views, we might end up asking correct questions. As for example, what did Plato observe 
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about the Sophists that made them one of his constant preoccupations? To start, we might notice 
that Plato sharply distinguishes this diverse group of individuals from the philosophers who 
worked before him such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, or Parmenides.93 The Sophists are not in 
pursuit of truth (alêtheia); they are in love with opinion (doxa). For Plato, the distinction rests in 
their object of love. This distinction is today extremely difficult to comprehend, for in modern 
usage, we call philosophers precisely those people whom Plato opposed. What Plato understood 
by opinions (doxai) is what we would call today theories. These theories are constructions of the 
intellect such as in John Rawls’ Theory of Justice.94 Plato’s characters are not trying to come up 
with a theory of justice, namely, a value system. Neither are they trying to define justice through 
logical analysis as modern analytical philosophers suggest. As we shall see, Socrates and his 
interlocutors are trying to discover what justice actually is. The matter must receive some 
attention since much of the contemporary literature insists that Plato introduces theories (as in 
doxai) or that he focuses on the inconsistency of arguments in regards to logic. I find these 
analyses to be concerned with concepts and prepositions rather than on what they actually refer 
to. They believe that Socrates is advancing opinions or simply dismantling propositions for their 
lack of logic, which is basically what Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of doing (338d). Of course, 
it would be absurd to suggest that Plato had no opinions of his own or that he paid little attention 
to terminology, phrasing, and consistency. In fact, Plato was the most careful writer given that he 
understood that philosophical discourse heavily relies on adequately conveying experiences and 
observations. Yet, for Plato, the object of philosophy was far from being the building of theories 
and the analysis of prepositions. Plato understood that words and concepts refer to things. If these 
things exist, they do so independent of our thought process. Plato is, in this sense, fundamentally 
a realist. As Plato understood it, concepts and prepositions are important and necessary tools for 
philosophical discourse, but they are certainly not the focus of investigation. Plato makes this 
explicit in the Republic by suggesting that excessive rigidity in the choice of terms is unworthy, 
for what really matters is the object of investigation (533c-e).  
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An attempt must be made to elucidate the philosopher’s object of investigation. As 
described by Plato in the Republic, the philosopher is the one who marvels before reality 
(alêtheia), contemplates it for what really is, and recognizes the “one” in the “many” (475e-
476b).95 Likewise, the philosopher is a soul (psuchê) habituated to the contemplation (theôria) of 
all time and all being (486a). The language that Plato uses to described the philosopher is in itself 
Parmenidean and the object of knowledge is what Parmenides called being (to on), the one 
reality.96 To this extent, the discourse (in the Foucauldian sense) to which Plato belongs is one 
that carries a complex and sophisticated intellectual history that dates back to Hesiod and cannot 
be summarized in a thesis. 97  Suffice it to say that Plato is continuing with a tradition of 
philosophers before him that inquired into the nature of reality, all who recognized reality to be 
one and orderly. These philosophers understood that there can only be a common order, namely, 
man exists in a universal order, in the xunôn in the Heraclitian sense.98 It must be added that this 
is not simply a point of view, an opinion, or a theory about reality. This is first and foremost an 
experience that cannot be put into words. These great men literately experienced themselves 
living in an order (cosmos) that transcended their communities and traditions. They perceived the 
order of society as part of the embracing cosmic order. Thus, as philosophers before him, Plato 
developed a higher degree of consciousness, which is expressed in the symbolism of the 
dialogue. Plato became conscious of Being, making it his object of investigation.  
Now, the pursuit for truth about Being is not an abstract investigation. On the contrary, it 
was an investigation concerned with direct experiences of living in the world.99 When we claim 
that Plato is a realist, we mean that Plato’s inquiry on justice (dikaiosunê) in the Republic is 
actually an inquiry into the reality of order in its most concrete sense, as it was experienced in 
Athens. For this reason, we can appreciate Socrates appealing to the experiences of his 
interlocutors. What is justice in the concreteness of our experiences? What do we see justice 
producing?100 As we shall see, given Plato’s historical context, that is, the state of affairs, these 
questions are extremely troublesome. Meanwhile, the point must be made that Plato never deals 
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with justice as an abstract, but in the concrete forms that justice and injustice assumed in the 
Hellas. The examination of Thrasymachus’ position will help us shed light into the matter. 
Thrasymachus’ intervention leaves us in a state of shock, for he is arguing with hateful passion 
that injustice is better than justice. The statement is scandalous enough, but the astonishment does 
not come from what Thrasymachus is actually saying, but from what he is actually doing. How 
can he address them in such a manner? There is no trace of civility in Thrasymachus. The tension 
is palpable. He is indeed a wild beast. Socrates is literately trembling and rightfully so, for 
Thrasymachus is more than a rude interlocutor. He is the personification of injustice itself. 
Thrasymachus means to offend, insult, and destroy what Socrates had accomplished, that is, 
persuading Polemarchus that justice is good. To begin, it is clear that Thrasymachus is not 
relativist, for he agrees with Socrates that virtue (aretê) is living in accordance to the order of 
things, which requires knowledge of the order and a way of life according to this knowledge 
(348d-e). This becomes explicitly evident when Thrasymachus dismisses Clitophon, for he 
(Thrasymachus) means to argue that reality is of such a nature that what is just is in the advantage 
of the stronger (340c).101 What Thrasymachus believes is that the order of things (the cosmos) is 
about the survival of the fittest (349c). Thrasymachus is conceiving the world solely in material 
terms, which fundamentally entails that all creatures alive are driven by necessity. What moves 
us, Thrasymachus argues, is strictly what keeps our bodies alive. To this extent, excellence 
(virtue) becomes a function of the power we exert in the world, over nature and over people, in 
order to gratify our bodily desires. This is what brings the greatest fulfillment. Thrasymachus’ 
understanding of reality and hence of justice is completely immanent, for it necessarily reduces 
reality to the life of passions, nothing else exists than our desires, which can only be ordered 
through mutual agreements.102 Note that only an atheist understanding of reality will hold that 
justice is an agreement (a contract). Since the world is completely dedivinized, only a contract 
brings order to existence. From this perspective, justice cannot be but a contract (a convention) 
that benefits the weaker. And indeed, when Thrasymachus jumps into the conversation as a wild 
beast, he is imposing himself on the rest. He means to show, just like a tyrant would, that he is 
the strongest among the group and his behavior is not reproachable, but rather worthy of 
admiration and praise (338c). 
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We have summarized Thrasymachus’ opinion and it must be noted that there is nothing 
inconsistent in it, unless one just interprets it as a collection of prepositions. What there is, 
however, in Thrasymachus’ presentation of his opinion is disorder. Thrasymachus is what would 
be described in Ancient Greece as polupragmôn, a busybody, someone who denotes a striking 
over activity, a habit or psychological compulsion to interfere in anything and everything.103 The 
noun of polupragmôn is polupragmosunê, which is treated in the dialogue as a practice that is in 
direct opposition to justice (dikaiosunê).104 This can also be appreciated by the way in which it is 
possible for Plato to use oikeiopragia (the antonymous of polupragmosunê, meaning, minding 
one’s own affairs) as a synonym for dikaiosunê.105 Athenians were not unfamiliar with this usage, 
for in the midst of the catastrophe, before the Sicilian Expedition, when Nicias urged his fellow 
Athenians to cease the enlargement of the Athenian Empire, Alcibiades, indisputably conscious 
of the pejorative implications of polupragmosunê, insisted that Athens’ inactivity would lead to 
its ruin.106 Alcibiades maintained that the only thing that would preserve Athens greatness was to 
continue the process of expansion and acquisition.107 “Given the position we have reached,” 
Alcibiades argued, “we have no choice but to keep hold of present subjects and lay designs on 
more, because there is the danger that, if we do not rule others, others will rule us.”108 It could 
have been just as well Thrasymachus giving that speech. Note, for example, when Thrasymachus 
argues that the best cities will make it their business to conquer and slave other cities (351a-c). 
Thus, we ought not think of Thrasymachus’ opinion as a theory of justice, that is, as an 
abstraction.109 No, it was a way of being in the world, precisely the way that led Athens to its 
disintegration.110   
As seen by Plato, the Sophists had a particular role to play in the corruption of Athenian 
society because they disseminated false doxa. We, moderns, are not unfamiliar with 
Thrasymachus’ doxa, namely, physicalism. As presented by Thrasymachus, physicalism is an 
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ideology that has its origins in the development of Ionian science of Nature in the beginning of 
the sixth century.111 This science was developed by Thales and his successors at Miletus in Ionia, 
a Greek colony on the coast of Asia Minor. All histories of Greek philosophy start with Thales of 
Miletus and it is generally agreed that he arrived at something that was completely new, what we 
call Western science, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The occurrence of science was 
only possible because gifted individuals were capable of detaching the self from the object. In 
other words, they differentiated themselves from the cosmos, which led them to the discovery of 
Nature, “an impersonal world of things, indifferent to man’s desires and existing on and for 
themselves.”112 The arrival of science was marked by tacit denial of all things supernatural, 
namely, transcendent experiences previously made intelligible through myths. Ionian scientists 
believed that the whole of reality could be explained in natural or material terms. In other words, 
Ionian science assumed that the whole cosmos was natural. Anything that formerly belonged to 
the realm of the supernatural (that which is incalculable and of divine providence, previously 
consisting on everything that existed) was now incorporated into Nature. The supernatural simply 
disappears. Intellectuals who reached this worldview probably thought that they had disposed of 
Greek mythology. However, we must note that the discovery of Nature did not get rid of myths, 
for more acute minds found that myths were not groundless fabrications of superstition. Yet, the 
foundations of Greek mythology suffered an irreparable impact. As Plato notes, the values that 
once brought order to the Hellenes were things of the past, for the conversation takes place in the 
Piraeus, in the underworld (327a-b). Athenian citizens were too enlightened, as modern people 
are today, to believe in the poets and in the gods. It was a time of crisis, for mythical cosmogony 
could no longer provide an intelligible account (a logos) of the world. Therefore, through 
Thrasymachus’ brusque interruption, Plato is masterfully illustrating how mythical cosmogony, 
as an intelligent account of cosmos, was superseded by physicalism. The violence and 
aggressiveness of Thrasymachus stands for the vicious demolition of the Hellenic myths, carried 
on by the Sophists, who through rhetoric, had made the world intelligible exclusively through 
material causality. To this effect, it is our contention that Plato’s Republic is at its core a 
restoration of the deteriorated symbols of transcendence after a century of sophistic destruction, 
which took place after the age of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus.113 Plato is seeking to 
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continue the tradition of the mystic-philosophers and the poets back to Hesiod, who experienced 
truth in their struggle against the unjust conventions of society.114 Thus, the dialogue carries the 
burden of intricate historical circumstances, in which Plato identifies the Sophist as the 
immediate adversary.115 
At this point of the conversation, we can appreciate that the issue is an ontological one to 
the extent that the discrepancies are concerned with the truth about reality (alêtheia). However, in 
Book I the issue is not addressed as such. Socrates deviates from properly addressing 
Thrasymachus, whose claim is not a trivial one.116 If we really wish to understand what happens 
in the exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Book I, we might refer to Socrates’ last 
statement. 
 “I seem to have behaved like a glutton, snatching at every dish that passes and tasting it before 
properly savoring its predecessor. Before finding the answer to our first inquiry about what 
justice is, I let that go and turned to investigate whether it is a kind of vice and ignorance or a 
kind of wisdom and virtue. Then an argument came up about injustice being more profitable 
than justice, and I couldn’t refrain from abandoning the previous one and following up on that. 
Hence the result of the discussion, as far as I’m concerned, is that I know nothing, for when I 
don’t know what justice is, I’ll hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a 
person who has it is happy or unhappy” (354b-c).117  
Socrates confirms that he never addressed the real issue, which leads to a seemingly trivialization 
of Thrasymachus’ position. Thus, Book I provides no answer to the original question and 
Socrates remains ignorant. Precisely for this reason, Thrasymachus has not been proven wrong.  
As pointed out by Socrates, Book I is merely a prelude (357a). It seeks to provide the context of 
the problem. This problem, Plato realized, is not merely a historical one, but, as we shall see, it 
concerned with the drama of human existence. 
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117 My italics.  
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A Plea for Help 
 
We have discussed, somewhat extensively, the context in which Plato wrote the Republic. We 
have also examined the two factors that he identifies as the causes for the disintegration of 
Athens, that is, an old generation unconscious of right and wrong and the Sophists. Now, we 
move to Book II, in which we will see a much more coherent defense of what Thrasymachus had 
to say about justice. By the end of Book I, Thrasymachus appeared to have been defeated, since 
Socrates is again capable of leading the conversation out of darkness by means of logic and by 
the exploration of concrete experiences. However, Socrates’ success is merely apparent given 
that Glaucon and Adeimantus, Plato’s brothers, are not satisfied. The brothers are both cleaver 
and spirited young men, who understand the power of Thrasymachus position, and realize that 
the battle is not over. They experience an ongoing struggle that Socrates, with his previous 
examination, failed to appease. Socrates never really addressed the real issue; he merely charmed 
Thrasymachus as if he were a snake (358b). Thus, Glaucon and Adeimantus loudly and clearly 
pose the question anew to Socrates, for they want to know “what justice and injustice are and 
what power each has when it is by itself in the soul” (358b). Note that the question is again 
restated ontologically, in the sense that we ought to find out what justice is in reality. If justice is 
not about the advantage of the stronger, then what is it about? And why is it good in itself? In 
essence, the brothers are urging Socrates to provide an alternative logos of reality, for only a 
different logos can truly defeat Thrasymachus and cast light on our existence. For this reason, the 
brothers wish to clarify Thrasymachus’ position, especially the force of his argument and to give 
Socrates a better understanding of what he is actually up against. 
In a more articulated manner, the speeches of Plato’s brothers simply restate 
Thrasymachus’ case, for the speeches follow the logic of Thrasymachus’ argument, and hence 
there is nothing that was not said before. Therefore, Plato’s intentions are really to dissect 
Thrasymachus’ position by dividing the foundations of his account in two, given that there are 
two speeches that Socrates will have to address. The first speech, Glaucon’s, deals with the main 
Hellenic opinions about justice and the order of things, whilst the second speech, Adeimantus’, 
deals with the sources of these opinions. Glaucon’s speech is wonderful inasmuch as it shows the 
concreteness of Plato’s thought and directs us toward the object of the dialogue. As Glaucon 
reminds us, the inquiry about focuses on “a way of life based on the truth about things and not 
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living in accordance with opinion” (362a).118 Note that, for Plato, opinions are not taken to be 
abstractions, but rather a way of living. In this sense, opinions are not disembodied. As we shall 
see, they actually mirror the order or disorder of our souls. Today, we would say that they echo 
our psychological state. But the comparison does not do justice to the Ancient Greeks because 
they were not moderns. They understood that wellbeing (eudaimonia) was a function of truth. 
Remember that both Socrates and Thrasymachus agreed that aretê was living according to 
alêtheia, which involves knowledge of reality and action in accordance with this knowledge 
(348d-e). Both treat aretê as a function of reality, that is, one is virtuous if, and only if, one lives 
according to the order of things. The word aretê itself carries that connotation, which is not 
captured by our notion of virtue.119 For ancient Greeks, virtue is a quality or the state that makes 
something good or excellent according to its being.120 What is more, aretê is not restricted to 
human beings. For example, in the dialogue, Socrates asks about the virtue of horses and dogs 
(335b). If something is a horse, its aretê as a horse is that state or quality that makes it a good 
horse, namely, endurance, calmness and so on. It might be a bit difficult for us, moderns to 
comprehend this notion because, nowadays, we conceive different cultures to have different 
systems of valuation (moral principles) in which one excels by following the rules thoroughly. 
Nonetheless, we must acknowledge that for ancient Greeks this was not simply matter of 
evaluation, but a matter of what actually makes something good according to its being. In this 
light, the inquiry about what justice is and about its power in the soul is directly concerned with 
whether or not man is such a being whose aretê is justice, that is, whether or not justice is a 
quality or state that makes man a good man. Put differently, what kind of creatures are human 
beings? Are they creatures purely driven by necessity as Thrasymachus argues? Thus, as Glaucon 
observes, the discussion is truly about reality (alêtheia), strictly speaking, about the order of 
things, including the nature of man and not about political or ethical concepts, ideas or opinions. 
                                                        
118 My italics. 
119 We associate virtue we moral excellence, goodness, righteousness as well as good sexual behavior. See Oxford 
Dictionaries, ed., Oxford Dictionary of English, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
120 See G.M.A. Grube’s translation of the Republic Plato, “The Republic,” in Plato: Complete Works, trans. G. M. A. 
Grube (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Co., 1997), II – fn.8. 
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Glaucon starts his speech by offering a genealogy of justice. The fact of nature (phusis), 
Glaucon states, is that doing wrong is good and being harmed is bad (358e).121 However, the 
misfortunes of being harmed outweigh the benefits of doing wrong. This is precisely why it is 
better to enter a contract, which would involved a compromise between the best case scenario, 
doing wrong and getting away with it, and the worst case scenario, being harmed and being 
unable to retaliate (359a). The agreement is the origin and the essence of justice (359b). Second, 
Glaucon continues, we know that our true desire is to outdo others and get more and more, which 
anyone’s nature naturally regards as good and strives for. However, nature is forced by 
convention to deviate from the natural way of things into respecting fairness (359c). Therefore, if 
you can avoid the contract, if you have the power to do so as a god, like Gyges with his ring, then 
you will be happier and profit the most (559d). To this extent, justice is never freely chosen 
(360c). Finally, and most importantly, it is only the appearance of justice that suffices, for it 
prevents harm and allows one to profit the most (362c). 
Glaucon’s speech brings us to an important distinction between a discovery and a 
genealogy. The quest of the dialogue is the discovery of justice, which ultimately leads Socrates 
and his interlocutors to the vision of the Good. In the classical sense, something is a discovery 
because its existence is independent of human belief or human making. For example, a thing that 
is found in nature (phusis) can be discovered. By contrast, when something is not independent of 
human activity, it cannot be discovered. Now, when Glaucon uses the word phusis in this 
passage, he does not mean “in nature.” Given that Glaucon is arguing that justice is a convention, 
phusis simple means originally. In other words, Glaucon is not talking about the nature of justice 
because he is arguing that justice is the result of human activity. When justice is taken to be a 
convention, it cannot be discovered. Hence, Glaucon traces the origin of justice (genealogy). To 
this effect, we talk of a genealogy of justice only when it is taken as the result of human customs. 
Consider, for example, Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals. It is important to note this because we 
must acknowledge that Glaucon is engaging in an intellectual debate about Nature, and hence, 
reality. Glaucon is putting forward an argument that arose as an outcome of Ionian science. 
Realizing what prompts Glaucon’s speech frees us from the overwhelming confusion about the 
subject of the dialogue, which is certainly not a theory of the nature of justice. The moment we 
                                                        
121 By nature, the Greeks understood what does not owe its existence and power to human belief, making, or 
convention. It is in opposition to nomos (written or unwritten law or custom) and technê (art or craft). See Thomas L. 
Pangle translation, The Laws of Plato (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), I - fn. 12.  
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think that the dialogue deals with theories about justice, it is the moment we have started 
misinterpreting the dialogue. Again, as Glaucon notes, the debate is about what is real and who 
lives according to the order of things.  
Once Glaucon has dealt with the most popular opinions about justice, Adeimantus joins 
the conversation because “the most important thing [in defense of Thrasymachus’ position] has 
not been said yet” (362d). Adeimantus addresses the sources of these opinions, namely parents, 
the poets and spiritual authorities. To begin with, fathers tell their sons about the importance of 
justice for the benefits of having a good reputation. Consequently, fathers praise the appearance 
of justice, rather than justice itself, for it is merely the appearance that brings the rewards (363a). 
It is true that the poets Hesiod and Homer praise justice, but they mostly speak of the rewards and 
punishments in the afterlife (363e). Yet, we all know that the gods also assign misfortunes to 
righteous people (364b). What is more, the appearance of justice also fools the gods as beggar-
priests and soothsayer say they can take wrongdoings away for a cost (364e). An intelligent 
person will soon realize that the life one ought to live, if one is to be happy, is to build a façade of 
illusory virtue and to form secret societies and political clubs under the instruction of rhetoricians 
who will help one succeed (365c-d). Finally, one ought not to be concerned with the gods, for 
either there are no gods or they do not bother with us. If the gods do exist, then one just needs to 
listen to the poets and learn to influence the gods through sacrifices (365e). For these reasons, 
Adeimantus concludes that no one chooses justice willingly, for injustice is more profitable and 
brings the most happiness in this world and in the next (366b). 
Adeimantus’ speech is insightful insofar as it is a historical portrait that schematically 
illustrates the dreadful deterioration of the Hellenic values. The arrival of the younger Sophists 
surely exacerbated the situation, yet, as explained by Adeimantus, traditional educators – parents, 
the poets and spiritual authorities – also professed an understanding of justice that corroborated 
Thrasymachus’ account. In other words, the moral predicament was embedded in society 
previous to the coming of the Sophists. This is precisely why Socrates points out to Polemarchus 
that Homer must be mistaken (334b). Moreover, as Adeimantus magnificently exposes, the 
perversion expresses itself in man’s understanding of the gods. Man is such a nonentity that he 
announces the nonexistence of the gods, or he projects his own corrupted existence upon the 
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gods, who are easily persuaded by prayer and sacrifice.122 To this extent, Plato’s brothers provide 
Socrates, and the readers, with an extraordinary compilation of life experiences, since the 
characters speak from their own experiential life and, when addressing Socrates, they do so by 
alluding to Socrates’ own experiences (357c). To be sure, they remain characters of a 
philosophical work and hence the experience belongs to Plato himself. Through the voice of his 
brothers, Plato is articulating what he must have felt as a young man lost in the chaos and 
corruption of the Athenian society. For a young man who truly cared for a life of excellence 
(aretê), the popular opinions of the time, as well as their sources, must have generated an 
overwhelming confusion. Yet, there was one man whose unflinching righteousness left little 
doubt about the existence of virtue. As his brothers in the dialogue, young Plato must have 
recognized the truth in Socrates’ integrity, since he lived according to the conviction that justice 
is “to be valued by anyone who wants to be happy, both for itself and for its consequences” 
(358a). Of course, given the state of affairs in Athens, Socrates probably struck most of his peers 
in the same way he struck Thrasymachus, as absurd, ridiculous, and even mad. But Plato and his 
brothers were not just any Athenians; they were the sons of Ariston, godlike children of an 
eminent man (368a). They certainly recognize Socrates as their rescuer as they explicitly ask his 
guidance toward the truth of the matter (358d; 366e; 368c). Therefore, what Glaucon and 
Adeimantus really represent is a plea for help from a soul struggling with, resisting, and refusing 
to accept unjust opinions and conventions. If we are to trust the symbolism of the Republic, 
encountering the astonishing intellect and colossal integrity of the man Socrates was, for Plato, a 
sublime experience and his lifelong inquiry regarding the order of Being is largely due to this 
encounter.   
We will never know if young Plato actually asked Socrates to provide him with an 
alternative logos that could defeat the destructive influence of the Sophists. We can only assume 
that the matter deeply troubled him, especially after the condemnation of his teacher. Socrates’ 
death must have certainly left Plato in such a state of shock and dread that he most certainly felt 
the need to explain what had happened. For Plato, it must have been a question of whether the 
execution of aretê in the person of Socrates was a permanent state of social affairs or was it that 
the moral obliquity of mankind, and its effects in society, was unavoidable. Though distressed, 
                                                        
122 Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 72. This is particularly interesting for us, moderns, who have also declared 
the death of God.  
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Plato must have surely realized that the decline of Athens, as well as Socrates’ death, was largely 
due to the fact that Thrasymachus’ opinion (doxa) was sedimented in society (493a).123 To this 
effect, Plato unveiled what Voegelin refers as the doxic state of the soul.124 In modern times, it is 
particularly problematic explaining what this condition consists of because, as we shall see, we 
too suffer from the same disease. Modern man does not know who he is and what he wants, and 
as such, he has also lost the ability to distinguish between reality and opinion, for everything is 
now a matter of evaluation.125 Yet, if we think that Plato is providing a theory (in the modern 
sense of the word) of justice, we have automatically fallen into the trap of the Sophist. We must 
start by recognizing that Plato is not dealing with opinions. Plato is describing phenomena (ways 
of lives) that led him to his epistêmê. To understand this, we might refer to the way Plato 
describes the condition, the doxic state, as a disease of the soul. The soul is sick because its 
constitution is disordered, and such a disorder prevents the soul for seeing how things in reality 
truly are.126 Plato approached the disintegration of Athens as a physician, as someone who could 
provide a clinical picture (eidos). In fact, the Republic is flooded with medical terms such as 
eidos or idea, which refer to the combination of symptoms that characterize an illness.127 The 
medical terminology suggests an empirical search for characteristics, in addition to combinations 
of characteristics, that are regarded as essential from the constancy of their occurrence in things 
perceivable under observation. 128  What Plato observed, empirically, is that most individuals 
attune their souls to the order of the city (politeia), that is, most people conform to their city’s 
mainstream opinions and habits. Plato also realized that following the order of the city does not 
have to be disastrous, since a city can be just and it can respect people’s humanity.129 But as 
observed by Plato, in times of Socrates, Athens was not such a city and its conventions conflicted 
with the order of things, particularly with the morphology of the human soul. As such, Plato 
                                                        
123 As Allan Bloom points out, Thrasymachus’ opinion is really the same as the city’s and, thus, he acts as its 
representative. See his interpretative essay in Bloom, The Republic Of Plato, 326. 
124 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:129. 
125 Since we live in times of idealism, we find things to be subjective in the strict sense of the word. We construct our 
own little worlds and we ultimately do not exist in the same reality. See Leo Strauss’ essay “The Three Ways of 
Modernity” in An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays (Wayne State University Press, 1989).  
126 As we shall see, the proper order of the soul is the main theme of the dialogue. 
127 The terminology was initially developed by the Ionian physicians of the fifth century B.C. Thucydides also used 
the terminology in his study of the Peloponnesian War to describe the disease of a society. Because a diagnosis 
implies that a thing has a normal state or a healthy state, it is not surprising that Plato adopted the useful vocabulary. 
See Friedländer, Plato: An Introduction, 16–17; Eric Voegelin, Order and History, ed. Dante Germino, vol. 2 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 425–432; Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:148. 
128 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:148. 
129 According to Plato’s diagnosis, Athens in times of Solon was a good polis (599e). 
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became aware that only a sick soul would believe that the origin of justice is the product of 
utilitarian calculus. In this sense, as far as Plato is concerned, Thrasymachus is not providing a 
theory or definition of justice, but rather he is exposing the doxic state of his soul, that is, the 
disorder in it. What is more, Plato must have arrived at the conclusion that a single doxic state of 
the soul is not essentially dangerous to the wellbeing of individuals and the community, but a 
mass corrupt society is extremely dangerous, for it is the greatest of all Sophists perpetuating the 
doxic state of the soul through social pressure.130 To this effect, Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ 
speeches also spotlight the social pressure to join in the doxa. The experience of social pressure is 
also portrayed in the prelude, when Polemarchus urges Socrates to give in and join them since 
Socrates was outnumbered (327c). Plato must have also felt pressure to give in, an experience 
that he could only describe as a disease forcing itself upon him. As his brothers did in the 
dialogue, Plato must have felt that the Athenian society was destroying his soul and, because of 
his own resistance, Plato deemed the phenomena to be an illness. Thus, by noticing the 
proliferation of the disease throughout the city, Plato arrived to the insight that the essence of 
society is psyche (phuchê).131 In other words, Plato realized that the corruption of society is the 
corruption of the psyche of its members. The disorder of Athens was a disorder in the soul of its 
citizens. Plato expresses his insight by having Socrates state that city is the soul written large 
(368d-e). 
 
The Soul Written Large 
 
When Plato’s brothers restate the question ontologically, it becomes evident that the purpose of 
the dialogue is to inquire into the reality of order, specifically order in human existence. Given 
that Plato conceived human affairs as primarily political affairs, any discussion about order in 
human existence was naturally a discussion about political order.132 To this effect, it is necessary 
to remark that Plato’s insight, that the city is the soul written large, is not a metaphor or an 
analogy per se, but rather it is taken to be a crucial insight about man’s social existence. To be 
                                                        
130 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:135. 
131 Ibid., 3:124. 
132 Plato perceived private and political affairs to be intimately intertwined. We can say that Plato had a very good 
understating of the person, but he did not conceive it as an individual, as we do in our modern world.  
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sure, Plato speaks of this insight metaphorically and discursively, without attributing it a 
technical name. But a proper analysis of the dialogue understands it as an anthropological 
principle.133As portrayed in the dialogue, Plato understood that all cultural practices, everything 
that belongs to the realm of the human, are manifestations of the human soul and hence they 
express its state, that is, its order or dynamics. This becomes particularly evident in the way Plato 
uses the term politeia, the way in which a polis is run, for both the order of the soul and the order 
of the polis. Politeia can be translated as a form of government, a constitution, or a regime. Yet, 
the way in which Plato uses it denotes dynamics of order, rather than political systems or 
governmental institutions. As Leo Strauss points out, it really refers to the way of life of the polis, 
namely, the political order.134 The politeia emanates from the soul that animates. Thus, it is not 
simply metaphorically that Plato uses the analogy. Put differently, Plato did not understand the 
study of politics as the study of institutions and political systems, but rather as an inquiry into the 
psychological state of affairs. Plato understood that forms of government are dead skeletons 
when they are studied without regard of the animating soul. To this effect, the goodness of a polis 
is determined not by the institutions or political systems, but by how the polis is run (politeia). 
Likewise, a person is good not because he is in excellent physical condition, but because of the 
politeia of his soul. From this understanding, good order cannot be created through institutional 
devices. On the contrary, relying on institutions and laws is a symptom of a diseased polis, for its 
members have not established the good politeia in their souls. A healthy polis has the least 
amount of legislation, for its people do not need to be told constantly what to do and what not to 
do, but their ways of life are in accordance with the order found in their souls (426c-e).135  
The paramount role of the psuchê in Plato’s thought indicates that politics is, for Plato, a 
matter of ethics. The intimate relation between politics and ethics is, of course, not exclusive to 
Plato, but it applies generally to Greek political thought.136 In the Republic, Plato explores the 
soul precisely because it concerns the political community. To this effect, we might be tempted to 
regard Plato’s dialogue as a work on human psychology, which is partially correct, except that 
                                                        
133 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:140.  
134 Leo Strauss, Leo Strauss On Plato’s Symposium, ed. Seth Benardete (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 
2003), 9. 
135 As we shall see, this is the reason why the luxurious city had to be put under so much restrain.  
136 See the introductory section to Ryan K. Balot, Greek Political Thought (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006). 
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Plato is not trying to immanentize the experience.137 The search for the transcendent source of 
order is real in Plato, particularly because the psuchê is conceived to be akin with the Divine.138 
This conception of the psuchê, as an immortal entity that gives life, is related to the origins of 
Western thinking. This type of thinking developed gradually from a simpler to a more complex 
understanding of man and the world by focusing upon that which is constant and unconditioned, 
by focusing upon truth.139 We have no other way of thinking, for our thought processes belong to 
this order and, for this very reason, we fail to understand that this type of thinking is until today 
the greatest of all revolutions. In the mystery of existence, the Greeks recognized the only tool 
available to man that illuminates being; the Greeks discovered the human mind. Man’s 
cognizance of himself – the discovery of the self – is man’s greatest achievement. We cannot 
even imagine not having a self, and yet, we know that before the Ancient Greeks, human beings 
existed in a different order; they existed unconscious of their being.140  
To be sure, the discovery of the mind was a gradual development. This drama, man rising 
to an understanding of himself, is revealed to us in all cultural practices such as rituals, literature, 
sciences and philosophy. We can see, for example, a clear transition in the heroes of the Iliad, 
who are no longer playthings of irrational forces; there is a well-ordered and meaningful world 
directed by the Olympian gods.141 Supernatural experiences as well as the origin of the universe 
are represented and explained through a comprehensive mythical cosmogony. The gods represent 
the internal and external forces experience by the mind, which had previously remained obscured 
or unaccounted for. Yet, the way in which the Homeric heroes understand themselves is worlds 
apart from the way in which Plato’s characters understand themselves. Homeric characters 
experience emotions not only from within, but emotions also have their origin from the outside 
                                                        
137 This point cannot be stressed enough. In fact, when translating the word phuchê, we must be aware that our 
notions of mind and psyche do not fully capture the transcendent implications it carried for the Ancient Greeks. It is 
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139 Bruno Snell, The Discovery of the Mind: In Greek Philosophy and Literature (New York: Dover Publications, 
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world; emotions are sent by the gods.142 Consider, how emotions arise in the Iliad. For example, 
In Book X, when “Athena, eyes blazing, breathed fury in Diomedes and he went whirling into the 
slaughter” swinging his sword against the Trojans.143 This is not merely a cultural difference, but 
it is a completely different way of being in the world. In Homer, the word psuchê does not 
designate the totality of the mind as we find in Plato, that is, there is no psychic whole.144 The 
psuchê of the Homeric heroes is merely the breath of air that left the body at the moment of 
death.145 Likewise, the thumos and nous appear to be more like independent organs such as the 
heart or the liver, each serving as the seat of (e)motion and vision respectably. 146 Since the 
psuchê is not responsible for the animation of the body, there is no “body” to animate. Of course, 
Homeric Greeks were human beings just like us. The point to be made is that they had no 
conception of the body. They did use the word sôma, which later in the fifth century will be 
understood as body, but, in the Iliad, it simply means corpse.147 Moreover, the psuchê is not an 
immortal entity with an afterlife. Both the nous and thumos die with the heroes that embodied 
them. The conception of the animating soul, the immortal soul or the eschatological soul, is first 
presumed in the thinkers of the generation of 500 B.C. It is particularly apparent in Heraclitus, 
who consciously explores the depth of this soul.148 As Plato, Heraclitus not only recognizes the 
body as a complete whole, but he also endows the soul with qualities that differ fundamentally 
from those of the body.149 For the purpose of this thesis, we do not need to go into the details of 
Heraclitus’ thought. What is important to acknowledge is that these qualities attributed to the soul 
signify a more conscious understanding of the human mind, which, with all certitude, is alien to 
Homer. 
Now, if we consider Plato’s intellectual background, the symbolism of the dialogue as 
well as the drama, it is not audacious to suggest that Plato is not simply recognizing the soul and 
the body as different entities, but he is consciously joining Heraclitus in the exploration of the 
animating soul. Since it must be determined whether or not the nature of the soul is such that 
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justice is its aretê, the inquiry about justice reveals itself as an inquiry into the psuchê.150 The 
symbols of night and day, darkness and light, descent and ascent, exemplify the movement of the 
soul toward a greater understanding of his being. The drama of dialogue is precisely the drama of 
man’s gradual understating of himself. As we shall see, Plato explores the morphology of the 
soul as to gain knowledge about man. For this reason, the inquiry is a cognitive inquiry that aims 
at educating the soul in a manner that is established in it a politeia with its best element as its 
ruler (590e-591a). The politeia within one’s self is not simply a metaphor, but a new existential 
meaning, for man will take active part in the politics of this city (592a). Glaucon recognizes, “you 
mean that he will be willing to take part in the politics of the city we were founding and 
describing, the one that exists in theory [en logois], for I do not think it exists anywhere on earth” 
(592a). And Socrates explains, “but perhaps there is a model of it in heaven [en ourano], for 
anyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citizen on the strength of what he sees. It 
makes no difference whether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would take part in the 
practical affairs of that city and no other” (592b).151 From metaphor to reality, man is a polis and 
his politeia must be ordered by looking at the transcendent source of order. 
 
The Investigation of the Dialogue 
 
The search for the transcendent source of order is real in Plato. Yet, we should not make the 
mistake to read Plato as if he were not a concrete thinker. To arrive at his insights, Plato never 
goes beyond observation. Plato’s enterprise is not what we might refer as scientific today. 
However, the spirit driving Plato is scientific to the extent that he seeks to acquire knowledge and 
understanding about the psuchê and, hence about social existence, through experience, thought, 
and the senses.152 For this reason, the inquiry into the soul of man is an investigation, namely, 
Socrates and his interlocutors set themselves on a journey to discover whether or not justice is its 
aretê (368c). The investigation adopts Plato’s insight, that the city is the soul written large, as the 
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underlying assumption.153 Under the guidance of this assumption, the procedure is to find and 
explore justice in a city in order to compare it to an individual. Given that the order of the city 
mirrors the order of the soul, justice in the city and justice in the soul should be alike (368d-
369a). Again, the procedure corresponds with the previous argument that the assumption is not 
merely a metaphor. 
The first step of the inquiry is to observe in theory the birth of a city with the purpose of 
uncovering how justice and injustice appear in it. The investigation goes through different phases 
corresponding to the different stages the city will go through. We can say that the dialogue deals 
with different cities as long as we understand that there is continuity. One city is built on top of 
the other one. The phases of the investigation are as follows:154  
a) The founding of the city and the establishment of order (369b-445) 
b) The embodiment of the vision of the Good (449a-541b) 
c) The decay of the city (543a-576b) 
d) The result of the investigation (576b-592b) 
The first phase of the investigation is the founding of a city. This phase is a theoretical 
examination that seeks to explore, by means of thought, how political organizations come to be. 
Note that Plato is not imagining man in the state of nature as modern philosophers such as 
Hobbes and Locke do. Plato is simply reconstructing how a community emerges as thousands of 
them have emerged in the history of humanity. First, Socrates looks at how the city would meet 
its basic needs. Human settlements start because human beings are not self-sufficient; they need 
one another to meet all their basic needs (369b-c). The implemented procedure is comparable to 
the procedure an anthropologist would use to determine how a specific city originated. This is 
particularly significant to us, because although the city is being built in thought, Plato’s 
procedure is an attempt to recreate a concrete reality, that is, Plato’s thought is not detached from 
perceptible phenomena. Likewise, Socrates and his interlocutors will act as the founders of the 
city as so frequently in the history of the Hellas statesmen drafted constitutions for new 
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colonies.155 Socrates is the designated oikistês, someone who is chosen as leader and given the 
power of selecting a settling place and directing the preliminary labors of the colonists.156 
Socrates reckons that the best way all necessities could be met is by recognizing that human 
beings are not all born alike, but each differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being 
suited to one task, another to another (370a). By developing the differences among men into 
skills, a community of men can deal with the necessities of life in a more satisfactory manner. 
Likewise, by arranging the different skills into a satisfactory whole, the city displays most modes 
of human existence.  
Socrates calls this first city true (alêthinê) and healthy (hugiês) because it pays attention 
to the natural differences of men and arranges them accordingly (372e). Justice, the ordering 
principle, is attention to the business for which a man is particularly talented by nature.157 In turn, 
injustice is interfering in things that are by nature another man’s specific chore, since meddling in 
someone else’s business reduces the efficiency of the order and ultimately disrupts it. The end 
result is a primitive community of free peasants, craftsmen, and small traders, who are neither 
rich nor poor, exercising birth control as to avoid poverty and war (372a-b). Members of this 
community live modest lives in peace and good health (372c).  
While the primitive city has a politeia by nature, not all men will be satisfied by it. 
Addressing merely the necessities of life and enjoying simple pleasures will not do for Glaucon, 
who is more repelled than charmed by the true politeia. Glaucon rejects the true order because he 
will not have his existence reduced to a peasant life. For Glaucon, and presumably for 
Adeimantus too, it is a city for pigs (372d). To be sure, the brothers are in pursuit of aretê, yet 
they cannot imagine a pursuit that excludes evenings like the one they are enjoying at the present, 
as guests of a rich host, in a marvelous house with confortable furniture, in the company of 
Socrates, absorbed in philosophical discourse (450b). They want a city that allows for their full 
development, for some men will want more that merely addressing the necessities of life and 
simple pleasures. The mode of existence express in the character of Glaucon cannot exist in this 
primitive polis without disrupting its order. The true city cannot accommodate men like the 
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157 Note that the ordering principle will be later developed into the virtue of justice, for both the city and the soul of 
man. 
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brothers, and hence, Socrates, instead of dismissing Glaucon, is quick at recognizing that the true 
city excludes some forces of human nature. We can rightly wonder whether the true city has 
room for the statesman and the philosopher. Can politics and philosophy prosper without the 
amenities of civilization?  
The striving of Glaucon and Adeimantus will convert the healthy city into an opulent city 
with unnecessary arts, composed of actors, dancers, nurses, tutors, and servants. The city will 
have a much larger territory to accommodate its new inhabitants. The city will also partake in 
war, for it might need to expand as to acquire necessary supplies (373e). Socrates calls this new 
city luxurious (truphôsa) and feverish (phlegmainousa), tacitly suggesting that the city is sick 
(372e-373a). Now, the city is not sick because it is luxurious, but because it is founded in a 
paradox. The city requires both high-spirited (thumoeides) and naturally philosophical 
(philosophos phusis) guardians in order to protect it from external threats (375a-e). Yet, by virtue 
of their specialization in the art of war, these guardians also have the potential to bring about the 
fall of the city. The guardians have the abilities to slave their fellow citizens, thus becoming their 
masters, rather than protecting them from invaders. Thus, the city needs guardians for protection, 
but what protects the city from the guardians? The city could be tore apart by internal forces, 
specifically those forces that was trying to accommodate in the first place. The paradox is 
extraordinary because it is meant to illustrate conflicts in society rising from the configuration of 
the psyche. Plato shows his genius not simply as a psychologist, but as a social scientist. 
The inherit instability of the luxurious city will require a restraining force that will put the 
guardians under control. Socrates himself is the force that will cure the city and restore order 
(stability) in the polis through the education (paideia) of the guardians. Since the guardians must 
specialize in war, their education must be one that overcomes the paradox on which the luxurious 
city was founded. The education proposed by Socrates follows the patterns of traditional 
education, that is, the body is trained through gymnastics and the soul through music (376e). Yet, 
it does not mean to simply follow tradition, for it also consists in an expurgation of traditions, 
starting with a theological revision. Here Socrates will address Adeimantus’ concerns, which 
highlight the moral predicament that was embedded in traditions (362d-366b). First, poets must 
represent the gods as they are (379a). Gods are only responsible for good things (379c, 380c). 
Gods are also true in words and in deeds (382e). The terrors of Hades are false (386a-b). Gods, 
demi-gods, and heroes do not lament their fates, for, unlike human beings, they are self-sufficient 
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(387c-d). Likewise, gods and divine creatures have their bodily desires under control, that is, the 
pleasures of drinking, sex, and food (389d).  
The theological revision is also accompanied by a selective musical education and a 
rigorous physical training that will harmonize the both natures (the high-spirited and the naturally 
philosophical) as to overcome the paradox (410e). The guardians cannot be exposed to material 
possessions and hence they will enjoy a communal life (416d-417b). The guardians shall possess 
everything in common, including “marriages, the having of wives, and the procreation of 
children” (423e-424a). The task of the guardians is to ensure that wealth and poverty do not 
spread in the city, since it prevents people from minding their own business (422a). The 
guardians must also prevent the city from expanding beyond the necessary (423c). This city, 
which has now being purified through the influence of Socrates, is called good (agathê) and right 
(orthê). Just like the primitive city, this newly purified city is once again organized by the same 
ordering principle (433a; 443c). Justice is doing one’s own work and not meddling with what is 
not one’s own. 
We should avoid being fixated on the provisions for the good city. To start, the provisions 
are conditional to the circumstances of the city and, hence, it would be a mistake to take them as 
a recipe for a good constitution.158 Of course, there are reasons for discussing the provisions, 
especially if one wishes to discuss the historical circumstances that prompted. However, far more 
interesting is the theological revision, which appears to be at the center of Plato’s concerns.159 In 
the first phase of the investigation, in the transition between the luxurious city and the good city, 
the tension between philosophy and mythical cosmogony is palpable. First, when compared to 
philosophical inquiry, mythical cosmogony loses is explanatory strength. Philosophy provides a 
more intelligent account (logos) about the order of existence than, for example, the Homeric 
epics. We have already discussed how the Olympian gods represent a well-ordered cosmos. Yet, 
the capriciousness of their characters does not properly represent Nature, the object of science. In 
this light, Plato’s attack on Homer and on the poets emerges as a conscious struggle against 
misrepresentations and wrong symbolizations of reality. Plato is not simply joining Heraclitus in 
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his exploration of the soul, but also in his critic of the poets.160 Thus, the Socratic education starts 
with a theology in which the gods become predictable and in harmony with the discoveries of 
Ionian science, that is, with the knowledge acquired through the study of Nature. They will no 
longer interfere at random and they are essentially not responsible for the fate of man. Most 
importantly, their divinity is defined by their lack of erôs, for they are self-sufficient and do not 
yearn. Plato is not removing the Olympian gods from the cosmos, but to be sure, their nature does 
not belong to the erotic world of Becoming. Self-sufficiency has no place in the ever-changing 
temporal order of the cosmos.  
Furthermore, philosophy is not simply superior in comparison to mythical cosmogony in 
accounts of its explanatory power, but given the state of affairs, it is indispensible. The language 
of the myth has become inaccessible, particularly to the minds of enlightened fundamentalists, 
who interpret the imaginative symbolization of divine forces literately, that is, as a collection of 
realistic, yet incredible, stories about the gods.161 Physicalism is characterized by a flatness of 
understanding. Symbols are not longer taken to be representation of experiences, but rather as the 
actual objects. For example, Zeus is no longer considered to be the symbol of ultimate divine 
order in the cosmos, but as the actual divine creature that rules the other deities. To this effect, 
Homer and Hesiod must be stopped, but not on the accounts against myth and poetry per se, for 
Plato himself makes use of them masterfully. Myths and poets ought to tell true stories about the 
order of existence (377d). The Phoenician Tale, a story about the unity of men through a 
universal humanity, is precisely such a type of truthful myth. The tale as a whole is untrue 
(pseudos), but the equality of men is true (alêthês) (377a). The differences between men are 
dreams (oneirata), whilst the reality (alêtheia) is their universal humanity (414d). Purposely 
evoking Hesiod and his metal ages, the myth also draws attention to the methodological question 
whether the truth disclosed by the mythos could be delivered by any other means at all.162 The 
truth about the equality of men is inexplicable and impenetrable to rational analysis.  
Once the good city has been founded and justice has been discovered to be the same 
principle on which the primitive city was founded, Socrates moves to complete the final part of 
the investigation, that is, to compare the good city with an individual (435d). Since the city is 
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composed of three classes (guardians, auxiliaries, and the people), the same three classes should 
be found within the soul of man. Socrates identifies three forces in the soul, the appetitive 
(epithumêtikon) (437d), the rational (logistikon) (439d), and the spirited (thumoeides) (440b). The 
identification is based on the function and object of love of each element (441a). The 
epithumêtikon is connected to the body in a relation of survival, indulgence, and pleasure (439d), 
which makes it its function the survival and wellbeing of the body (559b). Being in love with 
wisdom (581b), the logistikon allows man to learn and understand (580d). What is more, the 
logistikon has the capacity to know what is actually good for the whole soul (586d-e). However, 
even if the logistikon knows what is best for the whole, it does not and cannot operate by itself.  
The logistikon needs the assistance of the thumos, the element of the soul that strives for victory 
and honor (581b), as to allow for spirited actions (580d). Now, since the all the elements of the 
soul are lovers of something, it renders the whole soul as erotic. Order in the soul would mean the 
harmonization of the different erotic forces in correct super- and subordination. A well-ordered 
soul must displayed the same politeia as in the good city, namely, the erotic forces of the soul 
must stand to one another in a hierarchical relation with the rational element as the ruler. If this is 
so, each force corresponds to a type of virtue, that is, moderation (sôphrosunê), wisdom (sophia), 
and courage (andreia), respectively.163 Justice (dikaiosunê) is the main principle that harmonizes 
all the erotic forces of the soul and synchs them in friendship (442c-d).164 Since the logistikon is 
ruling, the priority is the wellbeing of the whole soul. Each part of the soul should get its fair due 
while not compromising the wellbeing of the whole soul. For this very reason, oppression and 
tyranny are not signs of friendship. 
If we understand the erotic forces of society as a reflection of the erotic forces of the 
psyche, Plato’s analysis of the orderly soul is essentially a theôria of the constitution of the soul 
through the transfiguration of erôs. Each polis represents the configuration of the erotic forces in 
the soul of its members. Plato is not trying to suppress erôs, but to positively affect its dynamics. 
For this reason, the ordering of the soul is the ordering of man’s striving. As political 
philosopher, Plato is concerned with the dynamics among the different social groups within a 
community as to determine whether or not it is possible for man to live in order. The exploration 
of the orderly soul led Plato to consciously theorize (in the ancient Greek sense) for the first time 
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in history about fundamental problems of order in human existence. The first problem, portrayed 
in the Phoenician Tale, is that men are both equal and unequal. For Plato, these differences were 
given in nature (phusis), but not so much in the biological sense as in the psychological sense.165 
Plato deals with this issue specifically in Book V when revising the provisions for the good city 
regarding the education of women. The most obvious biological difference is the female sex 
bears children while the male sex does not (454d). Yet, these differences, while not irrelevant, do 
not account for how accomplished a person could be in specific pursuits (454c). Put differently, 
regardless of sex, phenotype, and physical strength, people might be suited to pursue the same 
way of life if their souls are naturally arranged for it (454c-d). To this effect, Plato understood 
that men are equal to the extent that they all share the same elements in their souls (518c). The 
differences rest in the variants of the dynamic relations among the soul’s elements. In other 
words, the difference among men is a difference in the configuration of their souls. Being all 
elements of the soul erotic by nature, the configuration is dependent on the erotic strength of each 
element. Now, if we proceed like Socrates and apply the anthropological principle, the only way 
that a good polis could emerge is if the variants (people) can be harmonized in a correct 
hierarchical relation. Tragically, there is no guaranty that all the required variants (people), 
including the miraculous appearance of the philosopher, will appear in a given community.166 If, 
by some divine providence it was the case that all variants do appear in a group of men, the 
philosopher would be limited to what he could do given the concrete historical circumstances. 
That was the case of Socrates and Plato, who, with all their genius, were unable to reestablish 
order in Athens.  
A second problem identified by Plato was that the foundation and maintenance of a good 
city was depended on constant philosophizing, an issue that is not properly dealt with until Book 
VI and that culminates in the foundation of an even better city, the kallipolis (527c). If we recall 
the foundation of the primitive city, Socrates acted as the appointed oikistês, as the overseer. The 
city did not simply emerge “organically,” but it rose under the instructions of Socrates, the 
philosopher. We have the same situation in the founding of the good city. Socrates was the 
assigned overseer of the good city because he was the one overseeing the theological revision as 
well as the education of the guardians. To this extent, the order of the city is external to the city, 
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for it can only be found in the soul of the philosopher (412a). Thus, Plato depicts the philosopher 
as the ordering force in the community. But the philosopher, just like the good city, is not born 
with the order written in his soul. To be sure, the philosopher is born with the right disposition, 
but the order of his soul is the result of an education that aims at the contemplation of divine 
things (500b-d). In other words, the order in the soul of the philosopher has its origin outside of it 
as well. Plato masterfully illustrates the predicament in the Allegory of the Cave.  
The Allegory of the Cave is well known. It is a story that illustrates the philosopher’s 
education and his fate in a corrupt society, clearly alluding to the death of Socrates. The allegory 
starts by describing a group of men living in an underground cave, with an entrance a long way 
up, which is both open to the light and as wide as the cave itself (514a). These people has been 
there since childhood, immovable in the same place, with their necks and legs chained, capable to 
see only in front of them, for their bonds stop them from turning their heads around (514a). Light 
in the depths of the cave comes from a fire burning far above and behind them (514b). Behind 
them, also on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. Along this path 
a small wall has been built, similar to the screen that puppeteers use to show their puppets (514b). 
But the prisoners do not see the puppets directly. They cannot even see themselves. Having been 
chained with their heads in the opposite direction, unable to turn around, they are only able to see 
the shadows the fire casts on the wall in front of them (515a). Having grown up in these 
circumstances, they name the shadows believing that the truth is nothing other than shadows 
(515b-c).   
The description of the setting is short, but rich in symbolism. Once again, just like in the 
epilogue, Plato depicts human beings as living in darkness. Yet, human beings do not seem to 
belong to this environment. They are being held by chains to believe that what is real are 
shadows on the wall. Indeed, the allegory subordinates truth to reality; what is real is true. What 
we name is what we take to be real. Language neither constructs reality nor constitutes it. To this 
effect, Plato’s thought has no trace of Kant or Hegel in it. Man can know what is truly real if he 
is freed from his bonds. Reality or truth is accessible to man and not limited to the categories of 
the understanding, for the chains are external forces restraining man from what is truly of his 
nature. Man has eyes to see the light of truth. However, the bondage illustrates the human 
condition as almost hopeless. There is no actual explanation of how a prisoner is released. It sort 
of just happens inexplicably, one would say out of divine providence, in the same manner as the 
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appearance of a philosopher in a corrupt society (492e). Moreover, once the prisoner is released, 
he must be compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light (515c). The 
prisoner must be compelled because he is not even aware he is a prisoner. The prisoner must be 
also compelled because the way up is painful, both physically and psychologically. His eyes 
would hurt upon the contact with the light and he would be thrown back thinking that the 
shadows are truer than the objects themselves (515d). For this reason, the prisoner must be 
dragged by force, up the rough, steep path, into the sunlight (515e). The prisoner would need to 
get adjusted before seeing the things in the world above (516a). At first, he would see shadows 
most easily, then reflections of things in the water, and then the things themselves (516a). 
Finally, the prisoner would be able to see the sun itself (516b). Once the prisoner has seen the 
sun, he would deduce and conclude that “the sun provides the seasons and the years, governs 
everything in the visible world, and is in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see” 
(516b-c).  
Right after Socrates has explained how the prisoner arrives at vision of the sun, he urges 
his companions to fit the story together with what had been previously said before regarding the 
Analogy of the Sun and the Divided Line (517a-b). 167 Let us first explore what was previously 
said. Socrates had divided reality in two realms, the visual and the noetic (507b). What the sun is 
to the visual realm, in relation to sight and visible things, the Good is in the noetic realm, in 
relation to understanding and intelligible things (508b). The eye is the most akin organ to the sun, 
for it receives its capacity of sight from the sun. What is more, the eye, thanks to its power of 
sight conferred by the sun, is able to see the sun itself (508a-b). By analogy, the eye of soul 
(nous) is the most akin organ to the Good, for it has the capacity to understand (508d). Now, the 
Good is neither intellect (nous) nor its objects (nooumena).168 The Good is what make things 
intelligible in the noetic realm (noetos topos), that is, it “what gives truth to the things known and 
the power to know to the knower” (508d). In addition, the objects of knowledge not only owe 
their being known to the Good, but their being is also due to it, “although the Good is not being, 
but superior to it in rank and power” (509b).169 Lastly, though the vision of the Good (ê tou 
agathou idea) is the cause of knowledge (epistêmê) and truth (alêtheia), it is also an object of 
                                                        
167 Here, Plato does use the word analogos.  
168 The sun is neither the eye nor the objects the eye can see.  
169 The sun not only provides visibility but also existence, growth, and nurture to the visible things, although it is not 
itself generation (genesis) (509b).  
 55 
knowledge (508e). Note that was is an object of knowledge is the vision of the Good rather than 
the Good itself. In other words, what is a noetic object is the experience of the Agathon.  
Now, if we proceed to fit the allegory with the analogy as Socrates requested, we will 
understand that the leap in being is real in Plato, for “the visible realm should be likened to the 
prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun” (517b).  Since the sun 
is not itself generation (genesis) (509b), the Agathon is completely removed from the world of 
Becoming (518c-d). In other words, it is with Plato that the cosmos stops being enclosed. The 
introductory setting of the Allegory of the Cave, probably the most important aspect of the 
allegory, confirms our deductions. As described, the mouth of the cave is both open to the light 
and as wide as the cave itself (515a). This detail is important because it is often overlooked that 
the freed prisoner never steps out of the cave. The prisoner is dragged to the sunlight, but not to 
the outsides of the cave. Why does he not go out completely? It would appear as if the prisoner 
cannot do it, at least, he cannot do it and remain alive. The prisoner is in love with the things he 
cannot completely grasp. Plato describes these things as truly real, as unreachable, as unchanging, 
as things that are not subject to time and space (476e; 478a; 484b; 485a). Consequently, the 
philosopher seeks the immutable, yet he can never be so. He is a man with a body trapped in time 
and history. 
Although we have already stated that Plato was no modern, this argument requires more 
clarification because the most compelling argument that could refute our analysis understands 
that the noetic realm is merely noetic, namely, it is a realm of thought. There is nothing truly 
transcendental about it; it is just a quality of the psyche. Put differently, the study of the forms, 
including the form of the Good, is a purely theoretical endeavor. It is considered to be an abstract 
enterprise in the strict sense of the word.170 According to this view, the Divided Line is meant to 
illustrate the stages of comprehension until the achievement of real understanding. Truth be told, 
there is veracity about in this argument, for the upward journey to the vision of the Good is a 
journey of the soul and as such it requires noetic understating. Yet, Plato does not understand the 
endeavor to be purely a thought exercise. Hypothesis about things are thoughts that mean to 
explain the things themselves as in geometry, mathematics, and other related sciences (510d; 
511a). Hypotheses mean to explain the order and structure of the cosmos and, for this reason, 
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hypotheses are “stepping stones to take off from, enabling it [reason] to reach the unhypothetical 
first principle of everything” (511b). Something that is beyond or free from hypothesis has to be 
something real. To this effect, the first principle, the Agathon, is a real “object” beyond the 
subjectivity of the mind. If the first principle is real and beyond genesis, it means that it has to 
belong to another plane of existence beyond physics (metaphysics). From this also follows that 
the importance that Plato attributes to the soul has to do with its trans-phenomenal reach, that is, 
with its kinship with the Good and its capacity of contemplating it (518c). Plato moves beyond 
thought to the First Principle, to God.  
If the purpose of the investigation is to answer Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ question, then 
Plato is attempting to provide a logos, an intelligible account, about reality that moves “human 
thought to pass beyond physicalism as, earlier, physicalism had superceded mythical 
cosmogony.”171 Plato is concerned with people recognizing the divine in the cosmos, that is, the 
cosmos is not simply matter and flux, but it is orderly and structured due to the Good. Plato did 
not deny the flux of the universe, but he understood that, in such conception, the world could not 
have a logos, an intelligible account. And, even worse, in such conception, morality is merely a 
product of conventions, just as Glaucon illustrated in his speech. To this extent, Plato introduces 
the Allegory of the Cave to make explicit that a full understanding of reality requires a turning 
around of the soul to the vision of the Agathon (518d). The vision of the Good is reached only 
with difficulty (517b). It is an upward journey from Hades to the gods, until reaching the First 
Principle (521c). It is this turning around of the soul, the ascent to what is, that Plato took to be 
true philosophy (521c). Since the turning around of the soul requires the soul to already have the 
quality to see the Good, just as a man must have eyes to see the sun, the only thing an educator 
can do is to turn the instrument of vision around from the world of Becoming (genesis) to the 
world of Being (ousia) (518b-c). Thus, the philosopher’s education aims at inducing the upward 
journey of the soul (517b). The virtue created in the soul by the vision of the Good is not the 
same as the other four virtues previously discussed (518d). This virtue is called phronêsis (518e).  
Plato is a theist. Yet, Plato is not trying to provide a doctrine about God. This is why 
Socrates is so hesitant to speak of the Good itself (506c). About the Good itself, nothing can be 
really said. The Good is beyond the reach of the philosopher and prepositions regarding its 
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content are impossible. Probably, one of the fundamental insights of Plato’s ethics is that 
dogmatism is not possible; certitude is impossible. 172  Rather, Plato is concerned with the 
experience of the Agathon, the vision that creates the required virtue to rule well. This virtue is 
characterized by the lack of internal conflicts in the soul and with knowledge of what is actually 
good (520c-d). Phronêsis is written in the soul of the philosopher and the philosopher will write 
it in the community. And, for this reason, Socrates judges that only until philosophers rule as 
kings or those who are called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that 
is, until political power and philosophy entirely coincide, cities will have no rest from evils, nor 
will the human race (473c-d).  
As the prisoner in the cave, the philosopher who achieve the contemplation of the Good 
will be inclined to stay up there forever (517c). Having contemplated the truth, he will wish to 
live as close as possible to it and will not compromise his striving. Therefore, the philosophers 
who undergone the journey up to the mouth of the cave must be compelled to return and do what 
is just, that is, to do what is their function; they must return to rule (519d-520a). The decree only 
applies to the city that enabled the philosophical education, for the law persuades and compels all 
members of the polis to “share with each other the benefits that each class can confer on the 
community” (519e). The decree also brings us back to the opening scene of the Republic, the 
going down of Socrates. The philosopher must return in order to bring light to the darkness of the 
cave, to bring light into existence.  
Now, one must be extremely careful not to treat Plato’s construction of the soul and 
society as a doctrine. Plato was quite aware of its limitations.173 Yet, given that Greek statesmen 
drafted constitutions with the sole object of realizing them, we can rightfully wonder if Plato’s 
intentions were the reformation of Athens or the establishment of a new city. Of course, this is a 
matter of speculation, for we simply have not historical proof that Plato’s motives were those. 
Since the dialogue is being read as Plato’s own experience of reality, his intentions must be 
discovered within the realm of meaning constrained by the dialogues. 174  In the dialogues, 
particularly in the Republic, Plato is in serious competition with the statesmen, for there is 
                                                        
172 As Socrates points out, “Whether it is true or not, only the god knows” (517b). 
173 The construction of the soul can be also appreciated in the Phaedrus (246a). Yet, in the Laws, Plato abandons the 
construction and replaces it with more flexible symbolism of the puppets and their cords pulling in different 
directions (644d).  
174 Here, we are following the assumptions of the theoretical approach. See Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 
3:143. 
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definitely a Solonic component in his personality (599e). Plato is indeed criticizing reforms that 
took place during the fifth century, which finally led to the Peloponnesian War. However, Plato 
does not hold the mistakes of Athenian statesmen as the ultimate cause for the collapse of 
Athens. The dialogue points to the degeneration of the soul, and hence, Plato does not claim his 
authority as a statesman, but as a spiritual leader. Historically, spiritual guidance, that is guidance 
in the order of being, was provided by the nomos of the polis. In times of Plato, there was no 
separation of church and state and, thus, it is highly unlikely that Plato conceived his spiritual 
authority as different from the authority of a statesman. Ancient Greeks understood human 
existence as political existence and, to this extent, the restoration of order in the soul implied a 
political restoration in which the soul could exist as an active citizen. But, as explained by 
Socrates, it does not matter if this newly reformed city is ever founded in the concrete (592e). 
Plato was quite aware of the historical circumstances that prevented him from finding a political 
alliance that would undertake the founding of such a city under his philosophical guidance:   
“[T]he members of this small group [lovers of wisdom] have tasted how sweet and blessed a 
possession philosophy is, and at the same time they have also seen the madness of the majority 
and realized, in a word, that hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is no ally 
with whom they might go to the aid of justice and survive, that instead they would perish 
before they could profit either their city or their friends and be useless both to themselves and 
to others, just like a man who has fallen among wild animals and is neither willing to join them 
in doing injustice nor sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone. Taking all this 
into account, they lead a quiet life and do their own work. Thus, like someone who takes refuge 
under a little wall from a storm of dust or hail driven by the wind, the philosopher, seeing 
others filled with lawlessness, is satisfied if he can somehow lead his present life free from 
injustice and impious acts and depart from it with good hope, blameless and content” (494c-e). 
The dialogue consistently shows that Plato had no illusions of political success. Most 
importantly, the above quote shows that the preservation of order in the soul takes predominant 
importance over participation in the politics of the city. The philosopher owns nothing to the 
corrupt society. Yet, as the political being that Plato was, the unfortunate circumstances are 
deeply felt in the dialogue because under a suitable politeia, his own growth would have been 
fuller, and he would have saved the community as well as himself (497a). In this sense, it needs 
to be stressed the foundation of the city is not meant as political project that aims to bring about 
an ideal state. Plato is no ideologue. Plato is not concerned with ideals, but with the reality of 
order. As explained above, it is a cognitive inquiry in to the soul which, given Plato’s historical 
circumstances and who he was as an Athenian, unfolds as the founding of a city. This city goes 
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through four different stages.175 The first polis (369b-372c) is said to be healthy (hugiês) and true 
(alêthinê). The second polis (372c-376e) is said to be luxurious (truphôsa) and feverish 
(phlegmainousa). The third polis (376e-445e) is said to be good (agathê) and right (orthê). 
Finally, the fourth polis (449a-541-b) is said to be better (kallion) than the previous good polis 
and thus it is called the kallipolis (527c). To this effect, when we use the word ideal to describe 
Plato’s kallipolis, we are providing the connotation of a political ideal that Plato’s own 
vocabulary did not have. 176  The chances of misinterpretation are greater today because the 
subjectivity the word ideal carries allows philosophical insensitive scholars such as Karl Popper 
to accuse Plato of being an ideologue. Yet, Plato’s terminology – “by nature,” “good,” “best,” 
“right,” or “better”– is meant to describe the state (politeia) of a particular polis, and not a 
political project or political ideology.  
Finally, if Plato were an ideologue, the kallipolis, once established, should not 
disintegrate. The kallipolis is a city in which the Idea of the Good has been embodied; yet the 
embodiment can be solely temporary as it takes place in the world of Becoming. The fall of the 
city is inevitable because it is beyond the powers of man to predict and prevent the flux of the 
cosmos, particularly regarding the variants (people) required to maintain the order. Note that the 
provisions for the kallipolis, the community of women and children, attempt to address exactly 
that. The provisions are not a eugenic project, but rather their meaning is cosmological, that is, it 
concerns with the instability of cosmos.177 Because the kallipolis is not exempt from the rhythms 
of the cosmos, it is foreseeable that the guardians will educate children with the wrong 
disposition (546c). Once miscalculations have occurred, decay is unavoidable. Consequentially, it 
must be added that Plato’s kallipolis is not the form of the good city, but just a good city.178 Put 
differently, Plato’s analysis of a good city is indeed an analysis of a city, and not of the form 
(eidos) of the good polis. Plato is exploring a politeia, but there are as many forms (eidê) of 
politeia as there are human characters (544d-e). This must receive some emphasis since the city 
is one of the many good cities there could be, in the multiplicity of ways that it could be 
                                                        
175 We can say that the dialogue deals with four different cities as long as we understand that there is continuity. One 
city is built on top on the other one.  
176 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:136. According to Voegelin, when Plato’s good polis was first described as 
an ideal city, the intentions were to praise Plato. Yet, Voegelin argues that this generation had lost some of their 
philosophical sensitivity since an idealist is a person who is not in touch with reality. An idealist is someone who is 
not practical, whose valuations are in opposition to reality. 
177 See Voegelin, Order and History, 3:172-175.  
178 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:136. 
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arranged, according to the necessary conditions. Indeed, the fall of the kallipolis is narrated as a 
story that is conditional to particular circumstances that might affect the order of the soul. Thus, 
the purpose of the third phase of the investigation is to analyze disorders in the soul, namely, 




The concluding Book of the Republic is a masterful work on the Art of Measurement (metrêtikê 
technê), which is the art that permits man to disregard the distortions of judgment that stem from 
the perspective of time.179 What is ultimately real is not the ever-changing world of Becoming, 
but rather the out of time world of Being. Thus, Plato recognizes the vision of the Agathon and its 
embodiment in the soul of the philosopher as the correct measure, measuring life in the 
prospective of death and eternity. God, and not man, is the measure, as opposed to what the 
sophist Protagoras held (597c-d).180 Yet, the attack in the epilogue is not direct to the Sophists, 
but to the poets and poetry.  
To understand the attack, we must place in the context of the “ancient quarrel” between 
philosophy and poetry, a placement done by Plato himself (607b). Traditional poetry aimed at 
educating people by capturing experiences and lessons of the past. Philosophy, as understood by 
Plato, is also concerned with education. However, philosophy is not the capturing of experiences 
and lessons, at least not in words. Philosophia cannot be written down. Philosphia is a way of 
being in the world, an activity of living people in pursuit of the Good (521c). Philosphia is only 
written in the soul of the person who is consciously in pursuit of truth with all his being. To this 
effect, the Republic is not philosophy. The Republic is philosophical discourse, an expression of 
the philosophical experience, but not philosophy per se. Philosophical discourse is a particular 
form of poetry that aims at elucidating the philosophical life and the role of philosophy in human 
existence. However, anything that is important in life is ultimately alive and experiential, and 
hence, it is impossible to write down for the appreciation and learning of all. Plato might have 
written his dialogues with the purpose of inducing the philosopher’s education, but he was 
                                                        
179 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 2:365. 
180 Protagoras, Diels-Kranz B1.  
 61 
powerless regarding its effects. Education is a personal struggle because knowledge is embodied 
and hence, it must be personally achieved.  
Thus, the difference between poetry and philosophy cannot be reduced to style or content 
in spoken or written works, since written works such as the Republic are not philosophy. Yet, 
Plato does deem the dramatic dialogue form to be superior to any other form of writing, including 
comedy and tragedy, because it is the only type of inquiry that systematically attempts to acquire 
knowledge about things, without leaving hypotheses untouched until arriving to the 
unhypothetical First Principle, the Good (533b-c). While the understanding of soul had greatly 
advanced since Homer through the mystic-philosophers and tragedians, poetry in the traditional 
education had become obsolete and no longer useful as an instrument of expression for the 
experience of the philosophical soul.  To illustrate, Voegelin compares the four stages of the polis 
to Hesiod’s ages of the gods.181 The gods represent different forces of the soul, which Hesiod 
attempted to make intelligible in his Theogony. The forces of the soul are experienced as 
conflicting and, hence, the story is narrated as a series of battles and victories, until the highest 
ordering of the soul arises triumphantly. In the Republic, Plato uses the form by also arranging 
the cities, which represent the forces experienced by the soul that Plato seeks to elucidate, as a 
series of struggles until the kallipolis emerges victoriously having the best element of the soul as 
its ruler (520c-d). But, unlike the Theogony, the Republic is not an epic. It is rather a drama in 
which the characters periodically and dramatically imprint the essence of their characters into the 
polis. While epic depicts man as a plaything of the gods, drama depicts man as an agent. In a 
drama, man may or may not be empowered by the circumstances, but he has choices to make. 
Man is not completely at a loss. There is within his soul an instrument that, if properly turned, 
shows man his kinship with the Divine. Likewise, if the society is fortunate enough, there is also 
the philosopher who can guide both the individual and the community. Thus, the difference in 
style is not an accident, for it masterfully conveys the ascent of the soul to new existential 
meaning. It best portrays the drama of human existence, which, as an exploration of the psuchê, 
is the struggle of man rising into an understanding of himself. To this effect, it depicts man in its 
highest consciousness, for it illustrates man rising in his understanding concerning his kinship 
with the Divine and the misfortunes of not arranging his life according to its exigencies.   
                                                        
181 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:151. 
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Again, it must be stated that Plato is not at war with poetry as an art. Plato antagonizes the 
poets and poetry, specifically traditional poetry, because it could deter man from the Good. The 
quarrel is for the soul of man. Having distinguished the separate parts of the soul (595a), poets 
like Homer become a problem because their poems lack wisdom concerning the subjects of their 
poetry (602a). Homer and the tragedians know little about the psuchê and its kinship with the 
Good, since they do not realize that their poems mostly nourish the inferior parts of the soul by 
influences that play on its passions, ultimately destroying the strength of the logistikon (605a-b) 
and with it its ability of measuring correctly (603a). For this reason, if such poetry were to be 
allowed, it is “likely to distort the thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of 
what it is really like, as a drug to counteract it” (595b). The counteract drug is the right education 
that seeks to establish and preserve the right politeia within the soul (608a-b). When the soul is 
not beset by many evils, when we look at its pure form, without its association with the body, we 
realize that what it grasps and what it longs for is what always is, for soul is akin and immortal as 
the Divine (611b-e). To this extent, justice is the true aretê of the soul and the best thing for the 
soul itself, and for this very reason, a person ought to do what is just, with or without the ring of 
Gyges (612b).  
There is certainly a troubling but valid argument presented by the poets that is worth 
addressing. Poets might ask whether or not we also need a drug to counteract the effects of 
philosophy. If philosophy is a drug, is not there also a danger of overdose? Truth be told, if we 
follow the analogy, there is always a danger. Probably the most worrisome is the loyalty of the 
philosopher to the Good instead of the community. The philosopher is a radical, for he is unable 
to compromise his striving. For the philosopher, there is no politics that are worth engaging with 
unless they direct the community towards the exigencies of the Good. 182  Yet, politics are 
concerned, first of all, with the preservation of the community, which might entail compromises 
that the philosopher cannot make. After all, the community is an aggregate of many members 
with many different drives. Why would the community make a place for the philosopher if his 
loyalty is with Good and not with them? To this we must say that Plato makes clear that love for 
the Good comes before love of country, since each of us must neglect all other endeavors 
(including politics) and be most concerned to seek out and learn from the one who can 
distinguish the good life from the bad life (628b-c). Given the historical context, in which 
                                                        
182 Note that this is the only reason why the philosopher kings return to rule. 
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Athenians understood their aretê as political beings, we cannot help but recognize that Plato 
understands human beings beyond the community, beyond politics, that is, it is possible for man 
to achieve aretê beyond the community. This is not to be confused with liberal individualism, for 
Plato is not saying that man is not a political animal. Plato is discovering that man is more than a 
political animal; man has kinship with the Divine. Man is in-between the temporal world of 
politics and the everlasting world of eternity. But this only makes sense if we understand Plato as 
a theist, for he was trying to provide man with its rightful place in the order of the cosmos. Only 
philosophy can show the way up to the Good, within or outside the community.     
Plato culminates that dialogue with the Myth of Er, a man of all tribes, emphasizing once 
again brotherhood of men as well as the theological revision. The gods are not responsible for the 
fate of man (617e). The responsibility lies with the one who makes the choices, and thereby, each 
of us must neglect all other activities and be most preoccupied with seeking out and learning 
from the philosopher who can distinguish the good life from the bad life (618b-c). “This is the 


















This thesis has attempted to show that the Republic is also a dialogue about erôs, such as the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus, for it also aims at providing a direction to man’s striving. The 
Republic deals specifically with the morphology of the psuchê and its erotic nature. The soul is 
depicted by Plato as a manifold of erotic forces that, if properly ordered, show man its kinship 
with the Divine. To this effect, the psychological picture provided in the Republic is one of the 
first theorizations of the psuchê and its transcendental constitution.  
To arrive at these conclusions, one must be alert to Kantian interpretations and seriously 
ponder on the implications of what this means, even if it challenges what we believe to be true 
today. First of all, Plato was no Kantian. Unlike modern thinkers, Plato did not limit the capacity 
of reason to the categories of the understanding. Second, Plato was not an idealist (in the Kantian 
sense), for he was not concerned with ideas and concepts per se. To this extent, we must remain 
cautious to interpretations of Plato as a modern atheist who is concerned with a place in the 
history of ideas. Thus, we must ask ourselves, what motivated Plato to write a work of such a 
considerable length? The first part of the thesis’ analysis attempted to do just that by placing the 
dialogue in its historical context. For example, we considered the fact the Plato’s writings 
undermine political participation in a time when virtue was measured precisely in terms of 
political achievements.  
Plato’s Republic gains it specific meaning in the historical situation of Athens as well as 
in the intellectual discourse of philosophers that preceded Plato such as Xenophanes, Heraclitus, 
and Parmenides. The historical context was certainly intricate. They were critical times both 
physically, for Athens had lost the Peloponnesian Wars, and spiritually, since Greek mythology 
had been superseded by physicalism with the assistance of the Sophists.183 In the Republic, Plato 
provides both an assessment of the historical circumstances and a solution. The assessment is that 
                                                        
183 Voegelin, Order and History, 2000, 3:117. 
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mythical cosmogony had become harmful, since it enabled the dispersion of physicalism, which 
resulted in cynicism about the gods and depreciation of moral values. Plato realized that in a 
world explained only through material causality, morality could be nothing more than a 
convention.  
Plato’s provision starts with an examination of the psuchê, following the patterns of 
philosophers that preceding him such as Heraclitus. The stages of the polis are made intelligible 
as an exploration of the soul by accepting Socrates’ assumption, that the city is the soul written 
large, as anthropological principle (as an insight into reality) rather than as a metaphor or an 
analogy. The assumption entails that the different elements that compose a society are essentially 
a multiplicity of erotic psychological forces. Likewise, the soul is a manifold of social forces, one 
of them being an ordering force, the logistikon, due to its capacity to distinguish the right purpose 
for the other psychic forces. When the soul is properly ordered by the logistikon, it enables its 
ascent towards the idea of the Good, the First Principle giving order and structure to existence. 
The vision of the Agathon is first and foremost an experience. Yet, the Good is described by 
Plato as an “object” of knowledge outside time and space. For this reason, nothing much can be 
said about it, since immanent propositions cannot really capture its form. What is important, 
however, is the virtue embodied upon its contemplation, for it establishes the right order of the 
soul in the philosopher, who would then be able to measure through his soul the right order for 
society. To this extent, the distortions of time shall be overcome through the love of the measure 
that is out of time. Necessarily, if the order is not longer “cosmic,” Plato is portraying the advent 
of a new existential order that cannot be properly expressed through mythical cosmogony. Thus, 
Plato’s attack on the poets is not an attack on poetry and myth per se, but an attack on 
misinterpretations of reality. We are then essentially concern with Plato’s logos of the world.  
Erôs for the Good is the alternative logos. This is why we sustain that Plato was no 
atheist. The dialogue suggests a conscious search for a standard in reality for the proper 
metamorphosis of erôs. Now, we must understand that Plato is not providing us with a doctrine 
or system to make the world intelligible, for a full account is limited to the gods alone. Plato only 
seeks to provide, by means of reason, a way out of the darkness of Thrasymachus’ world. His 
investigation is then concerned with whether or not man can live orderly. And, most importantly, 
whether or not this order can be found in reality. Plato believed that man could uncover the order 
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of reality in the ordered soul, for it shows man its kinship with transcendental reality. To this 
effect, Plato recovered the mystery of existence. 
Having understood the circumstances that motivated Plato to write the Republic, it is not 
surprising that modern scholarship has paid so much attention to it. With the death of God, the 
Western world is now confronting with a similar predicament. Our historical reality is different, 
probably even more intricate, given technological emancipation and widespread secularization. 
Our Thrasymachus has become far more sophisticated, for nowadays, physicalism does not 
simply deny transcendental reality, but attributes it to the structure of the human mind, resulting 
in desensitization to our experiences and longings. Our yearning is now experienced with anxiety 
and dread, for man does not feel at home in the world and, in the modern age, all other doors are 
shut. We are now a society that submerges itself in science fiction, hiding from the painful 
“reality” while longing for the mystery we once experienced with joy. Consequentially, modern 
man has no choice than to behold immanent goals, resulting in the pervasion of reason into 
systematic and ideological thinking such as Communism, Fascism and Liberalism. The dangers 
of the dedevinized world are well known; modern man is faced with the abyss of immanent 
meanings of the world and eventually to the anarchy and horror of nothingness. Our times are 
indeed frightening times. We have not overcome the disease that led us to the bloodiest wars in 
the history of humanity. And it is impossible to think about any other solution than the one 
proposed by Plato over two thousand years ago. Since man cannot will himself into not being a 
man, man must reconcile with his experiential life. Only God knows how the drama of the 
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